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Early Chinese texts make us witnesses to debates about the power, or 
lack thereof, that humans had over the course of events, the outcomes 
of their actions, and their own lives. In the midst of these discourses on 
the limits of the efficacy of human agency, the notion of ming 命 took a 
central position.
In this article, I present a common pattern of thinking about the rela-
tionship between the person and the world in early China. I call it 
the reifying pattern because it consisted in thinking about ming as a 
hypostasized entity with object-like features. Although external and 
independent, ming was not endowed with human qualities such as the 
capacities for empathy, responsivity, and intersubjectivity. The reifica-
tion of fate implied an understanding of ming as an external, amoral, 
and determining force that limited humans without accepting inter-
communication with them, thereby causing feelings of alienation, 
powerlessness, and existential incompetence.
I first show that the different meanings of ming hold a sense of pre-
vailing external reality, and hence can be connected to the overarching 
meaning of fate. Then, I offer an account of the process of reification 
of fate in early China and its consequences, theoretical and practical, 
through cases study of received (Mengzi 孟子) and found (Tang Yu zhi 
dao 唐虞之道) texts. I end with some reflections on the implications of 
ming as a nonpersonal and nonsubjective type of actor for both early 
Chinese and twenty-first-century accounts of agency.
Overview
Early Chinese texts make us witnesses to (sometimes implicit) debates 
about the power, or lack thereof, that humans had over the course of 
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events, the outcomes of their actions, and their own lives. In the midst of 
these discourses on the limits of the efficacy of human agency, the notion 
of ming 命 acquired particular relevance and took a central position. In the 
early Chinese intellectual context, ming encompassed a series of areas of 
influence over human life, including but not limited to life span, sociopo-
litical success and failure, times and generation, physical conditions and 
health, and fortune and misfortune. Overall, we may understand ming as 
everything that happens without human intervention and remains out 
of human control. Most early thinkers shared a pattern of thinking about 
ming that established a problematic relationship between the person and 
the world: a relationship in which human agents were thought to be 
overpowered by external, objective, imposing, limiting, and detrimental 
forces. In early Chinese texts, ming was systematically seen as a problem 
requiring religious, psychological, or philosophical resolutions.
We find in early China two opposite yet coetaneous patterns of thinking 
about the relationship between humans and the problematic forces of ming. 
One of them, which we can call the personifying pattern, personified ming 
as a deity exclusively in charge of life span: Siming 司命 or the Manager of 
Allotments (also translated as Director of Allotted Life Spans, Arbiter of 
Fate, and Master of Fate).1 As an anthropomorphized figure, Siming, much 
like Heaven, the ancestors, and any other deities, was thought capable of 
intersubjectivity with humans. Humans wrote letters and made offerings 
and sacrifices to Siming petitioning for someone’s life.2 As a result, and 
despite the dubious efficacy of these possibly desperate pleas, people who 
believed in the figure of Siming must have found therapeutic relief in using 
the established channels of communication with the god in charge of life. 
We have evidence for the belief in this deity in charge of life span, Siming, 
as well as a certain Manager of Misfortunes (Sihuo 司禍), which strongly 
suggests that there must have existed other religio-bureaucratic positions 
covering the different aspects of ming mentioned above, to which people 
could have directed different kinds of petitions.3
The second pattern of thinking about the relationship between 
humans and ming is the object of the present study. I have called it the 
reifying pattern because it consisted of thinking about ming not as a sub-
ject (as it was the case in the personifying pattern), but the opposite: 
ming was construed as the reified object of fate. The reification of fate 
implied an understanding of ming as an external, objective, determining 
1. See Mark Csikszentmihalyi, “Allotment and Death in Early China,” in Mortality 
in Traditional Chinese Thought, ed. Amy Olberding and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2011), 178.
2. Csikszentmihalyi, “Allotment and Death in Early China,” 179.
3. On Sihou, see also Csikszentmihalyi, “Allotment and Death in Early China,” 178.
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reality that confronted and limited the subject without accepting inter-
communication with humans. In other words, in the reifying pattern, 
ming became hypostasized as an external and independent reality, but, 
short of being a subject, it was not endowed with human qualities such 
as the capacities for empathy and intersubjectivity.
The personifying and reifying patterns coexisted in tension in early 
China, which might partially explain the differences between religio- 
pyschological and philosophical approaches to the classical problem on 
the limits of human agency. While those who believed in the figure of 
Siming and other managers of fate were offered the opportunity to com-
municate with these gods through ritual channels in order to petition 
for the amelioration of their lives, those who viewed ming as impene-
trable, amoral, and nonsubjective forces deaf to human pleadings were 
compelled to develop philosophical responses to deal with the feeling 
of powerlessness left by those areas of life that escaped human control.4
Leaving aside the fascinating topic of the personified managers of 
destiny, who deserve further studies of their own, this article focuses 
on analyzing the pattern of thinking about ming as a fate-object, offer-
ing an account of the process of reification of fate and its consequences, 
theoretical and practical, through cases study of the Mengzi 孟子 and 
the TangYu zhi dao 唐虞之道. I end with some reflections on the implica-
tions of ming as a nonsubjective type of actor for both early Chinese and 
 twenty-first-century accounts of agency.
Ming as Fate-Object
Broadly speaking, everything that is beyond our control is called ming in 
early China. As the Mengzi defines it, ming is “what happens with no one 
causing it” (mo zhi zhi er zhi zhe 莫之致而至者).5 The Zhuangzi 莊子 gives 
us another encompassing meaning of ming as “what cannot be avoided” 
(bu ke nai he 不可奈何).6 The Mengzi’s definition takes the perspective 
4. It is probably no coincidence that most of our philosophical texts mention the 
figure of Siming only rhetorically while focusing on the vicissitudes proper to a reified 
notion of fate as part of their philosophical program. As an example, the Sunzi 孫子 
uses the expressions “the people’s Manager of Allotments” (min zhi Siming 民之司命, 
ch. 2) and “the enemy’s Manager of Allotments” (di zhi Siming 敵之司命, ch. 6) in a 
rhetorical effort to convey the fundamental role of a commander in his own people’s 
and the enemy’s chances of survival. While here a belief in the figure of Siming is not 
excluded, neither is it part of the Sunzi’s argument.
5. All translations are mine, although I have greatly benefitted from the work of 
previous translators. Mengzi zhushu 孟子注疏 (Shisan jing zhushu 十三經注疏 ed., 1816; 
rpt. Taipei: Yiwen, 1985), 6A.169b.
6. Zhuangzi jijie 莊子集解, ed. Wang Xianqian 王先謙 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 
1982), 4.38.
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of the causing agency, whereas the Zhuangzi’s evaluates ming from the 
point of view of its repercussion on humans. All in all, both of them 
point at the notion that there are events that happen without human 
intervention and which remain out of human control. These events con-
stitute the phenomenon of ming, an external, objective force that indif-
ferently and persistently affects the subject.
I do not wish to import categories such as fatalism, determinism, and 
free will from the Western philosophical tradition to frame my discus-
sion of ming, for three reasons. First, those categories do not find one-to-
one early Chinese counterparts, so they can confuse more than they can 
clarify. Second, concepts such as fatalism, determinism, and free will are 
charged with different layers of historically accumulated connotations, 
and at the same time, perhaps for that very reason, they have become too 
ambiguous and too empty to be useful at all (as Western philosophers 
recognize with contempt, like Dennett; with embarrassment, like Searle; 
or with hope, like Honderich).7 Third, even if I could temporarily disam-
biguate the categories for the limited use of this study, engaging with the 
voluminous Western scholarship in the topics of determinism and free 
will would be an unnecessarily exhausting task. And here I return to my 
first reason: Chinese thinkers did not use those categories.
The main category that Chinese thinkers used to talk about a realm 
of external and amoral forces that exercise determining influence over 
human life was ming. The reader must be aware that the word ming 
acquires a variety of different meanings in early Chinese texts: naming, 
command, mandate, objective circumstances, determining factors, and 
life span are the most common.8 All of these meanings, as diverse as they 
appear to be, are related in more than one way: philologically, seman-
tically, philosophically, and historically. That is to say, we are dealing 
7. See Daniel Dennett, Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984); John Searle, “Free Will as a Problem in Neurobiology,” 
Philosophy 76 (2001), 491–514; Ted Honderich, On Determinism and Freedom (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2005).
8. Fu Sinian 傅斯年 articulated five theories of ming in early China. See Fu, “Xing-
ming gushun bianzheng” 性命古順辯證, in Fu Mengzhen xiansheng ji 傅孟真先生集, vol. 
2 (Taipei: Guoli Taiwan daxue, 1952), 114. Nylan, in turn, distinguished twelve mean-
ings of ming in the Han, although many of them can already be seen in the Warring 
States period, in Michael Nylan, The Canon of Supreme Mystery: A Translation with Com-
mentary of the T’ai Hsüan Qing (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 35. 
Tang Junyi 唐君毅 associated different attitudes towards ming with Chinese schools of 
thought, in Tang, “Xian Qin sixiang zhong de tianming guan” 先秦思想中的天命觀, 
Xinya xuebao 2 (1957), 1–2. For a review of the secondary literature that classifies the 
different meanings and aspects of ming in early China, see Youngsun Back’s disserta-
tion, “Handling Fate: The Ru Discourse on Ming” (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 
2013), 8–18.
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with a word, ming, with different yet related meanings (polysemy), and 
not with different words that coincidentally happen to share graphic or 
phonetic features but not semantic roots (homonymy). For an exhaus-
tive review of the phenomenon of ming in China, as well as the ramifica-
tions and connections between the different meanings of the word ming, 
I would like to direct the reader to the most comprehensive resource in 
English: Christopher Lupke’s The Magnitude of Ming, a collection of com-
plementary essays by various experts discussing the etymology, seman-
tics, and intellectual history, as well as the sociopolitical, legal, cultural, 
literary, ritual, and ethical implications of the concept of ming in China 
from antiquity to the twentieth century.9
My discussion of ming in this section does not pretend to be exhaus-
tive, as my only goal is to show how different meanings of ming in early 
texts appear related in one particular way. It is my contention that most 
of the early Chinese meanings of ming hold a sense of prevailing external 
objective reality (in both aspects of how we are and what happens to us), 
and all of them can be gathered behind, or connected to, an overarching 
meaning of ming as “fate.”
The English “fate” comes from the Latin fatum, which literally means 
“that which has been spoken” and implies a sentence or command of 
the gods.10 In this way, fatum is close to the meaning of tian ming 天命, 
the command or mandate of god-Heaven, with the only caveat that the 
early Chinese Heaven does not speak. No text from early China records 
the words of Heaven, either in direct or indirect style, or suggests that 
Heaven speaks. In turn, while there is disagreement on the means that 
Heaven uses to express its will and mandates, testimonies of Heaven’s 
silence and nonverbal means of communication abound. Arguably, most 
of the philosophical, ethical, and political problems of early China, and 
the texts that embody these problems, precisely originate from Heaven’s 
silence. The locus classicus for Heaven’s wordless nurturing of the world 
is Analects 17.19, where Confucius compares himself with quiet Heaven 
in an implicit critique of verbose yet insubstantial and inefficient orators 
and rhetoricians.11 As opposed to the eloquent Greek and Roman gods, 
the early Chinese Heaven shows its command through the people’s 
actions, the sages’ words, and all sorts of natural and cosmic events.
9. Christopher Lupke, ed., The Magnitude of Ming: Command, Allotment, and Fate in 
Chinese Culture (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2005).
10. Jack Newton Lawson, The Concept of Fate in Ancient Mesopotamia of the First Mil-
lennium: Toward an Understanding of “Šīmtu” (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1994), 5.
11. 子曰：天何言哉？四時行焉，百物生焉，天何言哉？ (“The Master said: Which 
use has Heaven for words? The four seasons follow its course, and the hundred kinds of 
things are born. Which use has Heaven for words?”) (Lun yü zhushu 論語注疏 17. 157b).
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Another related sense of fatum (and the Greek moira) is that of one’s lot, 
what is fated to happen, and an allotted life span.12 As we will see below, 
we find a similar meaning of ming in early Chinese texts that points at 
both descriptive and normative conceptions of life expectancy and life 
span. Finally, fatum also referred in a more abstract way to an external 
force that shapes events and influences or determines outcomes.13 It is 
especially in this more general and abstract sense that I translate ming as 
“fate.” That is the overarching meaning of ming that I want to empha-
size, as it serves as a connection among all the other particular and con-
crete meanings. In the following examples, I discuss different meanings 
of ming in early China as they illustrate the reifying pattern of thinking 
about ming as a fate-object: an external, objective, determining reality 
that confronts and limits the subject, thereby  introducing a problem that 
requires a solution.
Ming as Command
One of the widespread meanings of ming in early texts is command, 
appointment, and mandate, both as verbs and nouns, and even as a text 
type.14 The reader might be familiar with the notion of tian ming, usually 
translated as the Mandate of Heaven. The ideology of the Mandate of 
Heaven, which may have already been in existence by the early Western 
Zhou period (1046–976 b.c.e.),15 granted a personified god-Heaven the 
capacity to judge human behavior and consequently bestow its mandate 
to a deserving ruler. This religio-political ideology was used in retro-
spect to justify conquest and legitimate the victorious ruling house. First 
applied to the Shang conquest of the Xia, and used repeatedly after-
wards, it argued that Heaven shifted its mandate when the virtue of a 
ruling house decayed, enabling the virtuous conquering power to seem-
ingly effortlessly obtain the throne with the support of Heaven.16
12. Lawson, The Concept of Fate, 5.
13. Lawson, The Concept of Fate, 5.
14. Ming is a textual category in the Documents (Shang shu 尚書), which we 
can  translate as “charges.” Other textual categories include “admonitions” (gao 誥), 
“canons” (dian 典) and “oaths” (shi 誓).
15. Some texts inscribed in early Western Zhou ritual bronze vessels suggest that 
the ideology of the Mandate of Heaven was already at work in this period. I discuss 
this issue in the paper “Is the Ideology of the Mandate of Heaven Already Present in 
Western Zhou Bronze Inscriptions?,” presented at the International Consortium for 
Research in the Humanities (IKGF) in Erlangen, 2018.
16. Sarah Allan has discussed the ideology of the Mandate of Heaven in terms of 
the tension between the “heir” and the “sage,” that is, between hereditary and merito-
cratic approaches to rulership. See Allan, The Heir and the Sage: Dynastic Legend in Early 
China (New York: SUNY, 2016).
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However mandated they may have been, Heaven’s commands 
to the king, much as the parallel case of the king’s commands to his 
subordinates, were all tasks to accept voluntarily. That is to say, ming 
as command or mandate holds no notion of inevitability, yet we may 
understand a command as being fated in the sense that it belongs to the 
commanded person by family history, birth, or social and moral condi-
tion.17 As an example, among the inscriptions that were cast on ritual 
bronze vessels during the Western Zhou period, some texts are records 
of investiture ceremonies. They show official subordinates accepting 
the command, mandate, or appointment (ming/ ling 令)18 that has been 
assigned to them by their king, as well as kings accepting Heaven’s 
mandate to rule.19 In both cases, the political commands involve legiti-
mate delegation of power within a closed elite circle largely defined by 
family boundaries. In quite a few inscriptions, the voice of the current 
king claims to participate in the same power inherited from Heaven as 
the Former Kings 先王 (Wen 文 and Wu 武), recipients of the original 
mandate at the beginning of the Zhou dynasty.20 By doing so, the cur-
rent king puts himself in a position to transmit the mandate to his own 
subordinates, establishing a lineage of power that extends from Heaven 
to the chosen appointee. Much as the king belongs to a royal lineage that 
goes back to the Former Kings, the appointed officials belong to a family 
tradition responsible for serving royal members (as it is apparent in both 
the Shi Qiang pan 史牆盤 and Lai pan 逨盤 inscriptions). In this sense, 
they all share a family fate.
17. It is in this sense that Solomon distinguishes between determinism and fatalism. 
Determinism proposes that there is causal necessity inherent to all events, whereas 
fatalism offers not a causal necessity but a narrative one. In the fatalist view, outcomes 
attributed to fate would be necessary only within the narrative of a group that shares 
a common sense of purpose. Robert C. Solomon, “On Fate and Fatalism,” Philosophy 
East and West 53.4 (2003), 437–39.
18. The terms ming 命 and ling 令 are interchangeable in Western Zhou bronze 
inscriptions. See Laurent Sagart, The Roots of Old Chinese, Amsterdam Studies in the 
Theory and History of Linguistic Science 184 (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company, 1999) and William Boltz, “Language and Writing,” in The Cambridge History 
of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C, ed. Michael Loewe and 
Edward Shaughnessy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 74–91, for a 
discussion about the intimate relation between these two terms. For the origins of the 
graph ming and its evolution, see Lin Meiling 林玫玲, Xian Qin zhexue de minglun six-
iang 先秦哲學的命論思想 (Taipei: Wenjin, 2007), 54–78.
19. For subordinates accepting appointments, see, for instance, the inscriptions on the 
Shi Qiang pan 史牆盤 and the Lai pan 逨盤. The royal inscriptions Wu si Hu zhong 五祀㝬
鐘 and Hu gui 㝬簋 are examples of kings accepting Heaven’s command to rule as an 
extension of the original appointment given to the founding kings Wen 文 and Wu 武.
20. See for instance, Maogong ding 毛公鼎, Da Yu ding and Shi Hong gui.
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The inscriptions present us with two caveats to the notion of ming 
as an unavoidable and fated command: first, the appointee must be up 
to the task and accept it; second, it is not a given that, even after hav-
ing accepted it, the appointee will be able to perform the task. In the 
bronze texts, these caveats take the form of formal acceptance of the 
given orders, promises of intentional effective performance, expressions 
of anxiety in the face of potential failure, as well as pleas for support to 
the gods and ancestors to be able to fulfill their tasks.21 The family fate, is 
to be understood as an inherited mission in this world rather than as an 
unavoidable imposition. In some situations, an individual is allotted a 
particular mission not because of his family relations, but because of his 
extraordinary virtue. These are exceptional individuals who are chosen 
to do something great: that is their appointment, lot, or command. The 
most famous case is probably that of Emperor Yao 堯 abdicating in favor 
of a worthy man of humble origins, Shun 舜, instead of his own son, a 
story narrated in the Documents (Canon of Yao and Canon of Shun) but 
also in found manuscripts such as the Guodian 郭店 bamboo text that 
editors have called The Way of Tang and Yu (Tang Yu zhi dao 唐虞之道).
In received texts such as the Documents and Odes (Shi jing 詩經), too, 
it is common to see that the Former Kings’ receipt of Heaven’s mandate 
was preceded by demonstration of extraordinary virtue. An illustration 
of this idea is found in the “Admonishment to Kang” 康誥, where we 
read that King Wen 可明德慎罰 “was able to be discerning in his virtue 
and careful in the use of punishments,” among other demonstrations of 
deserving behavior. King Wen’s prudence is a precondition for Heaven to 
offer him the great appointment.22 Although this idea is not so common 
in the bronze inscriptions as it is in received texts, there are a few excep-
tions, one of which is the Maogong ding 毛公鼎, which reads: 王若曰:父
歆!丕显文武,皇天引厌劂德,配我有周,膺受大命 (“The King spoke to the 
effect: ‘Father Yin! Wen and Wu, the Greatly Illustrious! August Heaven 
was greatly content with their charismatic power. They were worthy of 
our blessed Zhou, and so they received the great appointment.’”)23
In all these cases, the appointees endowed with a ming can, but should 
not, do otherwise. The relationship of this kind of ethico-political com-
mand with fate in early China has therefore a soft sense and a strong 
21. A greater variety of illustrations of the unstable and compromising nature of the 
command can be found in received texts. For instance, they abound in the Documents 
and the Odes. See also Tang Junyi, “The T’ien Ming [Heavenly Ordinance] in Pre-Ch’in 
China,” Philosophy East and West 12.1 (1962), 202.
22. Shang shu zhushu 尚書注疏 (“Kanggao,” 201a).
23. Yin Zhou jinwen jicheng shiwen 殷周金文集成釋文 (Hong Kong: Xianggang zhon-
gwen daxue zhongguo wenhua yanjiusuo, 2001), no. 2841.
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one. On one hand, it is a soft kind of fate because it is not completely 
unavoidable, whether the failure to fulfill the charge is due to choice or 
malpractice. On the other hand, it is a strong kind of fate because the 
larger sociopolitical schema demands for the allotted person to follow 
through with the task to which he has been appointed. Although we do 
not find in this meaning of ming a fatalistic view of human and heavenly 
relationships, there are social and moral imperatives to act in a certain 
way: for the mandated king to govern, and for the appointed official 
to serve his ruler. In this way, the understanding of ming as command 
belongs to the more general pattern of thinking of ming as an external 
imposition of the object of fate.24
Ming as Life
Ming often takes the meaning of life span in early texts. Understood 
as life expectancy in a descriptive way, it is interchangeable with the 
term tian nian 天年, the natural number of years that a living being is 
expected to live according to its species (a tree might be expected to live 
longer than a person, and a person longer than a cicada). While certainly 
ming can be a descriptive term signaling the number of years someone 
lives, it also acquires in early texts a prescriptive connotation pointing 
at the number of years one is allotted to live. For instance, one Zhuangzi 
passage in “Great Ancestral Master” (Da zong shi 大宗師) explains that 
“dying and being born, that is [the works of] ming,” in the same way 
that “the constancy in the succession of days and nights is [the works 
of] Heaven.”25 A different Zhuangzi passage in “Metaphorical Lan-
guage” (Yu yan 寓言) discusses the idea that life and death might both 
be ordained (ming). One of the speakers of the dialogue challenges the 
conventional view that life happens spontaneously (wu zi 無自) whereas 
death has an external cause (you zi 有自) by setting doubts on what we 
can actually know about these processes.26 Similarly, in the Han phi-
losopher Wang Chong’s 王充 words, ming is responsible for “when we 
are born and die, and whether we are to live long or die early.”27 Our 
ming in these usages is not describing our life span but pointing at a 
normative dimension of our allotted years. In the normative sense, our 
life span would be endowed to us at birth, as a kind of physical individ-
ual fate. This ambiguity permeates the early meaning of ming as life in 
early China.
24. See David Schaberg, “Command and the Content of Tradition,” in Magnitude of 
Ming, ed. Lupke, 23–48, for a thorough discussion of ming as command.
25. Zhuangzi jijie 6.58.
26. Zhuangzi jijie 27.248.
27. Lun heng jiaoshi 論衡校釋, ed. Huang Hui 黃暉 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1990), 3.20.
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However, much as in the meaning of command discussed above, nei-
ther ming as life span nor as allotted years necessarily imply inevita-
bility. In several texts, we learn that the person should protect her life 
and/or allotted living years from being cut off too early. This implies 
that even in the case of being fated with a pre-determined life span, the 
amount of years one actually lives may change. For instance, metaphoric 
trees in the Zhuangzi save themselves from being cut down before their 
time by being useless to humans. Only those with fine wood will attract 
the axe.28 Another cause of premature death related to the dangers of 
attracting unnecessary attention, a recurrent theme in the Zhuangzi 
and other early texts, is punitive execution. A third common cause of 
dying “early,” in this case not involving external intervention, is fail-
ing to nurture habits that protect one’s health from deteriorating too 
quickly. Sleeping the adequate number of hours, eating and drinking in 
moderation, and covering the body with clothes suitable for the season 
are basic measures everybody can take to live out their years, whether 
these are simply a matter of life expectancy or a more serious matter of 
a pre-ordained life span.29
We also learn from early texts that, beyond protecting her life span, 
the person can even choose to try and lengthen it. While some of these 
strategies to live longer, even to become immortal, are quite feasible 
and resemble the hygienic habits advised to protect one’s life span from 
being cut off too early, other means are more sophisticated, requiring 
harmony with the dao 道 and the four seasons, cultivation of inner power 
(de 德), vital energy (qi 氣) and a complete spirit (quan shen 全神), as well 
as comprehension of yin yang 陰陽 shifts.30 Both scenarios, protecting 
one’s original life span and attempting to extend it, imply that our years 
of life are susceptible to change.
Yet this understanding of a person’s life span is part of the more gen-
eral view of ming as fate-object in that it works as an externally imposed 
28. Zhuangzi jijie 4.45.
29. See, for instance, “Xingshi” 形勢 chapter of the Guanzi 管子. Guanzi jinzhu jinyi 
管子今注今譯, ed. Li Mian 李勉 (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu, 1988), 64.940.
30. On these practices, see for instance the Huangdi neijing 黃帝內經. Yang Weijie 楊
維傑, Huangdi neijing suwen yijie 黃帝內經素問譯解 (Taipei: Lequn, 1977), 1.9. Livia 
Kohn has thoroughly studied Daoist religious and hygienic practices. See, among oth-
ers, her Introducing Daoism (New York: Routledge, 2008). On the Huangdi neijing and 
Chinese medicine, see Nathan Sivin, “Huangdi neijing,” in Early Chinese Texts: A Bibli-
ographical Guide, ed. Michael Loewe, Early China Special Monograph, no. 2 (Berkeley: 
Society for the Study of Early China and the Institute of East Asian Studies, University 
of California, 1993), 196–215; and Paul Unschuld, Huangdi neijing Suwen: Nature, 
Knowledge, Imagery in an Ancient Chinese Medical Text (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2003).
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pattern of the world that determines how we are and what we are to 
do. As in the previous case of ming as command, ming as life span holds 
both a soft and a strong sense of fate. In the soft side, we find that what 
is given, in this case one’s years of life as a human, is not unchangeable 
and is not beyond human intervention. Whether it is in the descriptive 
sense of life expectancy or in the normative sense of allotted years, the 
individual ming can be cut off too early if it is not properly protected and 
lengthened by resorting to hygienic and alchemic procedures. Yet once 
again we also find a strong sense of fate in the conception of ming as life. 
Many early sources contain a critique of those who neglect their years 
and allow themselves to die before their time. For instance, Zhuangzi’s 
“Robber Zhi” (Dao Zhi 盜跖) chapter harshly criticizes legendary figures 
such as Bo Yi 伯夷 and Shu Qi 叔齊 who lent themselves to starvation on 
the margins of the world out of political remonstrance. That they thought 
themselves to be doing the right thing only proves their commitment to 
a failed system of beliefs, one that does not have nourishment of long life 
(yang shou ming 養壽命) at its center.31 The Wenzi 文子, in turn, includes in 
a description of the state of affairs during the Yellow Emperor’s (Huangdi 
黃帝) golden age the ideal situation that “common people would protect 
their life spans and not die prematurely.”32 All this suggests that there 
was a strong current of thought in early China that considered protecting 
one’s life, regardless whether the amount of years is pre-ordained or not, 
a necessary individual commitment and a moral responsibility.
As in the case of ming as command, our expected or pre-ordained life 
span is not something that we can determine. It comes to us as a given, 
posing a problem and requesting a reaction. Ming as life span is not an 
unavoidable fate, but it is regarded either as a detrimental limit (when it 
is short and we are encouraged to extend it) or as a responsibility (short 
or long, we must protect it). In both scenarios, our life span is construed 
in early Chinese literature as an objective and external imposition, and 
as a problem that needs addressing and resolution from the subject, 
which makes it part of the more general understanding of ming as a 
fate-object.
Ming as Determining Factors
In Wang Chong’s worldview, the duration of our life is just one of 
the determining aspects of ming. Ming also determines other outcomes, 
such as whether we are to be rich or poor, fortunate or unfortunate, a 
31. Zhuangzi jijie 29.263.
32. Wenzi zuanyi 文子纘義, ed. Du Daojian 杜道堅 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 
1989), 2.4b.
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success or a failure. It is a complex combination of individual and supra- 
individual factors which decides the minutiae of one’s existence: inborn 
physical and personal features, social context in which one is located, 
what one encounters through own efforts, incidents that simply happen, 
and the general state of affairs of the country—the latter being a tran-
spersonal fate shared by all members of a generation. These competing 
aspects of ming are hierarchical. The clearest example of the hierarchy 
found in the Lun heng 論衡 is the transpersonal ming of the state winning 
over the individual ming (國命勝人命):33 nothing can prevent a strong 
individual endowed with extraordinary physical features from prema-
turely dying in war.
With his intricate theory of ming as the combination of determining 
factors of human life, much as with many of the other writings in the 
Lun heng, Wang Chong was opposing the common belief of his time 
(first century c.e.) in a personified god-Heaven that would decree our 
destinies.34 The doings of Heaven, he argued, are not purposeful and 
do not accord to laws of moral retribution in terms of punishments and 
rewards for our behavior. Heaven acts in a wuwei 無為 manner: spon-
taneously and purposelessly. Hence, it is incorrect to blame Heaven 
for one’s outcomes, such as misfortune, and a waste of time to make 
 offerings and issue pleas for Heaven to act on our behalf.
According to Wang Chong, our life is controlled by an interrelated 
web of competing, determining factors rooted in physical and meta-
physical bases. While we can exercise our capacity for purposeful 
agency in an effort to guide our destinies, the outcomes of our actions 
and the turn of events are almost never decided by such efforts. It is clear 
from ordinary experience, the Lun heng argues, that rightful actions do 
not always help the agent have a successful life. There are simply too 
many factors playing with our luck for our intentional efforts to be able 
to exercise enough influence. In most occasions, the different potencies 
at play in a situation are too strong for our contingent actions to have the 
power to override them.
Wang Chong’s theory of ming offers a clear example of the pattern 
of thought of ming as fate-object in early China. The different factors 
that compose ming present an effective, objective, and external deter-
mination over the course of the person’s life. Much as the conception of 
ming as command, mandate, or appointment, and ming as life span, the 
understanding of ming as determining factors assumes a reifying view 
33. Lun heng jiaoshi 6.45.
34. The Lun heng is commonly understood as the work of Wang Chong. However, 
it is a compilation of many different writings, many of them surely not written 
by Wang.
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of the different phenomena involved in life and exercising influence on 
the person where these are conceived in terms of external opposition, 
determination, and limitation.
We have seen that the different meanings of an impersonal ming were 
all related to the overarching notion of ming that can be understood as 
fate: what happens without our intervention, affects us, and cannot/
should not be avoided. We explore the process of reification of fate in 
early China in detail in the next section.
The Reification of Fate
Origins of Ming
Scholars of Mesopotamia point to the experience of livelihood in an 
agrarian society as a likely scenario for the development of the notion 
of fate. Relying on natural resources such as water, soil, weather, and 
seasons for sustenance may have made early inhabitants of the world 
aware that there were forces beyond the divine which, like gods but 
separate from them, had a determining and inescapable influence over 
their lives.35 In early China, these natural workings and patterns that 
configure the material, spatial, and natural contexts were subsumed 
under the categories of Heaven and Earth (tiandi 天地), while fate was, 
in general terms, rather associated with sociopolitical and individual 
events. Heaven and Earth were responsible for the cyclical changes of 
the four seasons; they defined geographical accidents, established cos-
mic patterns and movements, provided materials means of sustenance, 
warned through omens, and also threatened (sometimes punished) 
with floods, earthquakes, and other natural disasters. Fate was in turn 
responsible for social success and failure, personal physical features and 
health, life and death, and conditions of living in general. The Confucius 
of the “Mountain Tree” (Shan mu 山木) chapter of the Zhuangzi, to which 
we will return, puts it nicely when he associates Heaven and Earth with 
scarcity of food and water, as well as extreme heat and cold, leaving 
ming to be responsible for social rank and emolument.36
For early Chinese thinkers, the natural order provided by Heaven 
and Earth could, to a certain extent, be predicted, and even tackled by 
adjusting to it. A variety of devices such as calendars and other mantic 
35. Bernard Clive Dietrich, Death, Fate and the Gods: The Development of a Religious 
Idea in Greek Popular Belief and in Homer (London: University of London, Athlone Press, 
1967), 2.
36. Zhuangzi jijie 20.173. The divide is not always so clear, as tian and ming, Heaven 
and fate/different kinds of mandates, may appear conflated in philosophical 
 discourses.
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methods were introduced to help humans understand the workings of 
Heaven and Earth and conform to their natural pattern, thereby putting 
the natural order to human advantage and preventing it from becom-
ing an impediment to human society’s growth, harmony, and stability. 
As distinguished from the workings of Heaven and Earth, ming was 
not something that could be predicted, and definitely not something 
that could be tackled. It belonged, therefore, to a different category of 
uncontrollable reality, one that was especially problematic.
The understanding of ming as fate-object becomes a pattern of 
thought in early China that explains human relations to the world as 
inherently problematic. The fact that there are determining, opposing, 
reducing, limiting phenomena affecting the control that humans can 
exercise over their lives is seen as a problem that needs to be addressed 
and solved. This problem is generally understood in the literature as a 
tension between nature and humanity, or the problem of the relationship 
between Heaven and man. For twentieth-century scholars, the different 
approaches to the dichotomy between Heaven and the human that we 
find in early texts became a common way to classify positions and isms 
in early Chinese philosophy, as well as a way to identify developments 
within the intellectual history of the period.37 For instance, A. C. Graham 
famously spoke of a metaphysical crisis that took place in the fourth cen-
tury b.c.e.: the intellectual realization of the separation between Heaven 
and man, and the doubt whether Heaven is after all on the moral side. 
He then classified Mencius, Zhuangzi, Mozi, and other pre-Qin  thinkers 
according to their approach to the side-effect problem of morality and 
human nature that had evolved from the split between Heaven and 
humanity.38 In a similar manner, Puett classified philosophers accord-
ing to the position they take with regard to the relationship between 
nature and culture, humanity and divinity (a relationship that could 
be one of continuity and harmony, or discontinuity and tension), trac-
ing the historical development of the different claims and the debates 
in which these claims were inserted.39 Whether or not one agrees with 
the methodological assumptions behind these scholarly efforts to map 
early  Chinese philosophy and intellectual history, they identified and 
37. Some of the most important representatives are Tang Junyi, “The T’ien Ming 
[Heavenly Ordinance] in Pre-Ch’in China,” Feng Youlan 馮友蘭, 中國哲學史 (Shang-
hai: Shangwu, 1934; translated by Derk Bodde as A History of Chinese Philosophy, Princ-
eton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983); A. C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: 
Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1989); Michael Puett, 
The Ambivalence of Creation: Debates Concerning Innovation and Artifice in Early China 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).
38. Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 107–8.
39. Puett, The Ambivalence of Creation.
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analyzed important issues in early China, among them the problem of 
what is beyond human control and the problem of fate.40
It is ironic that ming would become such a problematic concept, 
because, according to scholars such as Chen Ning 陳寧, the notion of a 
blind, amoral fate was invented in early China as a solution to a previous 
problem: the problem of theodicy created by the ideology of the Man-
date of Heaven.41 Simply put, the ideology of the Mandate of Heaven 
established Heaven as a moral judge of human action. However, in their 
daily experience, people could see that the virtuous were not always 
rewarded. Often they even seemed to be penalized. The causal link 
between moral behavior and success seemed to be broken, which com-
promised assumptions about the morality and ultimate legitimacy of 
Heaven. The endangered position of Heaven in this religious conflict is 
similar to that of the omnipotent Christian god when followers faced the 
problem of evil. Why would a moral god allow bad things to happen, 
especially to good people? This problem led in Western traditions to the 
invention of theodicy: theoretical justifications of a compromised god.
Western theodicy has a long history. The most famous episode in the 
Western intellectual history of evil is probably that of the earthquake 
and subsequent tsunami that flooded and destroyed Lisbon and beyond 
in 1755. The natural disaster triggered a revision of Leibniz’s positive 
theodicy. Leibniz had argued that, in choosing the best of the possi-
ble worlds, God had to allow a minimal necessary amount of evil for 
the greatest good of the community. Evil was therefore a residual illu-
sion only felt from an individualistic and partial point of view. After 
the catastrophe, which greatly affected the community, Voltaire and 
 Rousseau each issued their critiques of the generally accepted positive 
theodicy and let the problem of evil off the leash; it would thereafter 
dominate the intellectual discourse in a reinforced fashion. In early 
China, the invention of the notion of a blind, amoral fate, an impersonal 
force of its own unrelated to Heaven, may have been a response to the 
same problem: blind fate was a power to blame for the existence of evil 
and injustice, so that Heaven could keep its moral integrity intact. Of 
course, Heaven, like the Christian god, did not get off so easily. The 
40. Common to these twentieth-century approaches (much less so in twen-
ty-first-century scholarship) are the assumptions that (1) masters’ texts were authored 
by the masters that give them name, or disciples within their school of thought; (2) we 
can date texts and thinkers with enough precision to establish an intellectual line of 
development within the pre-imperial period.
41. Chen Ning, “The Genesis of the Concept of Blind Fate in Ancient China,” Journal 
of Chinese Religions 25 (1997), 154, 159. Robert Eno, The Confucian Creation of Heaven. 
Philosophy and the Defense of Ritual Mastery (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1990), 27.
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human relationship with Heaven became tense and ambiguous, as 
 certain thinkers began to suspect that Heaven was not always moral. 
We will return to this tension later.
Even if the notion of blind fate started as a solution to a previous 
 problem, it soon became a problem itself. Humans were believed to exist 
in opposition to an overpowering force that was blind in direction and 
external in nature, which lashed them arbitrarily and often in detriment 
of their aims and expectations. For this pattern of thought to become 
effective, the reification of fate was necessary.
The Process of Reification
The word “reification” may bring Marxism to the reader’s mind. The 
concept of reification gained currency in Marxist-Hegelian social phi-
losophy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, especially 
through Lukács’s reinterpretation of Marx’s denunciation of the fetish-
ism of commodities in the capitalist system.42 The term originally tar-
geted the “thingification” of social relations. I ask the reader to try and 
forget about Marx for a minute, and instead grasp the literal meaning 
of reification as turning a conceptual item into a thing, leaving aside its 
repercussions and all its implications with regard to Western moder-
nity and capitalism. In the understanding of ming as fate, some early 
Chinese thinkers turned fate into an object, which was a process that 
involved different steps and had several important consequences for 
the intellectual history of the period. The phenomenon known as reifi-
cation, here understood broadly and adapted to the early Chinese con-
text, provides us with a technical vocabulary that proves appropriate 
and helpful to theorizing the pattern of thought of ming as fate-object 
in early China.
In brief, the process of reification of fate, as found in received and 
excavated early Chinese texts, consists of understanding ming-fate as 
an external object in opposition to the subject that imposes limits on the 
subject and is often negative and detrimental to his aims and goals. The 
following traits of the process of reification of fate in early China can be 
analyzed separately:
42. Many scholars find the locus classicus of the concept of reification to be György 
Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness, published in 1923. The word “reification” is 
found and used in different ways in the work of previous philosophers such as Kant, 
Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger to point out the dehumanizing and alienat-
ing tendencies of modernity. After Lukács, twentieth-century philosophers have often 
criticized and reinterpreted the concept in a variety of ways. None of these interpreta-
tions is particularly relevant for my usage of the concept here.
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OBJECTIFICATION
In the reifying pattern of thought, fate is made an object that is opposed 
to the subject. This is clear not only from the philosophical content of 
early texts, but also from the use of grammar. The words used to convey 
the notion of an amoral and blind fate, which are ming and, in some 
occasions, shi 時 and shi 世 (“the times” and “the age” become objectified 
as the force of fate) always act as grammatical objects. For instance, as 
we will see later, it is common to read in these texts that ming is some-
thing to be awaited, or something to be accepted. Ming never takes on 
the role of a subjective agent except when it is personified as Siming.43 
With the exception of the Manager of Allotments, ming never takes on a 
subjective role in early texts.
The fact that ming never acts as a subject in early China is even more 
striking when compared with the use of Heaven in early texts. Heaven 
shares with fate in being a source of explanation for things that happen 
to humanity. However, and as opposed to fate, Heaven is often anthro-
pomorphized and made a subject.44 In early texts, Heaven is portrayed 
as a full subjective and intentional agent when it makes a command or 
sends down luck and calamity, when it chooses a new political leader 
or protects the people from an evil one. Not only does Heaven act, 
when humans relate to Heaven there are many possible transactions: 
pleas, prayers, offerings, commands, rewards, punishments, praise, 
and so on. In the relationship between Heaven and man there is a pos-
sibility of intersubjectivity, that is, of exchange, communication, and 
interpretation of meaning. Humans have the capacity to interact with 
Heaven.
On the contrary, the reifying pattern rendered ming a blind, deaf, and 
silent object that had determining influence over human life yet did not 
accept communication. Of course, as a conceptual entity, fate is different 
from ordinary objects: it is a hybrid between nature and culture.45 Yet in 
the early Chinese reifying pattern, fate appears reified with object-like 
43. On Siming, see the Overview section. In Greek mythology and philosophy, fate 
also became personified as the “Fates” or Moirae, goddesses with fully intentional and 
subjective capacity of agency. Lisa Raphals compares the understanding of fate in 
Greek and early Chinese philosophy in her article “Languages of Fate,” in The Magni-
tude of Ming, ed. Lupke, 70–106.
44. Chen Ning, “The Genesis of the Concept of Blind Fate,” 158. Wang Chong is one 
of the first philosophers to criticize the anthropomorphization of Heaven. In his view, 
Heaven is not an intentional, subjective agent, but a part of the natural order which acts 
in a spontaneous, non-purposive manner. We will return to this point in the Implica-
tions section.
45. On hybrid objects, see Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern 
 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
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features. One of these features is the lack of subjectivity and responsivity. 
As opposed to the relationship of humans with gods, which is two-way, 
transactions are impossible with regard to fate. Humans are passive with 
regard to fate: they can only accept it, await it, and try to understand it.
Note that “understanding fate” (zhi ming 知命), an important topos in 
the reifying pattern of thinking to which we will return later, does not 
involve knowledge of how fate works. Understanding in this context 
does not imply knowing in a technical way: it is not an attempt to grasp 
fate’s working process, but rather the conviction that fate is beyond 
human knowledge, and that there is no way to control and overcome 
it. Understanding fate means to be able to live at peace with fate and 
to show tolerance toward human ignorance about how it works. It is 
no surprise that ming often is defined in early texts as 不知所以然而然
者 (“that which happens without knowing the means by which it hap-
pens”).46 One of the chapters in the Zhuangzi begin by affirming that,
達生之情者，不務生之所無以為；達命之情者，不務知之所無奈何。47
Those who have mastered the conditions of life do not strive after what 
life has no means to do. Those who have mastered the conditions of 
fate do not strive after what knowledge has no means to change.
Not only is fate beyond the reach of our knowledge, but no kind of 
human knowledge we may have has any effect over the workings of 
fate and its outcomes. As one anecdote in the Lüshi Chunqiu 呂氏春秋 
concerning the figure of Yanzi 晏子, prime minister of the state of Qi 齊 
during the Spring and Autumn period and purported author of the 
Yanzi Chunqiu 晏子春秋, tells us, 人事智巧以舉錯者不得與焉 (“the wis-
dom and skills used to do and undo human affairs cannot reach [fate]”).48 
The anecdote qualifies Yanzi as someone who understands fate because 
he demonstrates accepting that nothing he may know and nothing he 
may do can get in fate’s way. Humans cannot appeal to wisdom or 
 trickery when it comes to fate.
The rupture of any possible relationship between humanity and fate 
is a consequence of reification. Fate is construed as an opaque object 
that defies meaning. This opacity turns fate into something dangerous 
and scary. As hermeneutists know, interpreting (not only texts, but any 
kind of cultural or natural object) is a way of taming, a way of making 
46. See this definition of ming in Zhuangzi jijie 19.163; Lüshi Chunqiu xin jiaoshi 呂氏春
秋新校釋, ed. Chen Qiyou 陳奇猷 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 2002 [1984]), 20.8.3, 1347; and 
Liezi jishi 列子集釋, ed. Yang Bojun 楊伯峻 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1979), 2.2.64 and 6.6.193.
47. Zhuangzi jijie 19.156.
48. Lüshi Chunqiu xin jiaoshi 20.8.3.1347.
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something manageable, conformable.49 In their incapacity to interact 
with fate, humans do not know how to deal with it. The object of fate 
cannot be interpreted; it renders meaning impossible. Since humanity 
is affected by fate, the reification of fate not only makes fate meaning-
less; it also renders the meaning of human life difficult to interpret, even 
unbearable.
EXTERNALIZATION
Reification can be defined as “the act (or result of the act) of transform-
ing human properties, relations and actions into properties, relations 
and actions of man-produced things which have become independent 
(and which are imagined as originally independent) of man and gov-
ern his life.”50 Taken out of its original context, this definition helps us 
understand the feature of externalization in the reification process in 
early China. The entity of fate is the subject’s cultural creation, but when 
the creation is reified it becomes externalized and hypostasized, which 
means that it is given independent and abstract reality external to the 
subject, as if it had always existed out there, as a fact of nature.51
The ascription of the final outcomes of our lives to an external entity 
that does not depend on our actions or our wisdom, as we have seen 
in the previous point, is a result of externalization and hypostasis. The 
feature of externalization is also explicit in the internal–external/sub-
ject–object dichotomy (nei 內–wai 外, sometimes expressed in terms of wo 
我–wai 外 or ji 己–wai 外) that many early Chinese thinkers establish. An 
example of the dichotomy appears in the following lines of the Huainanzi:
夫人之拘于世也，必形系而神泄，故不免於虛，使我可系羈者，必其有
命在於外也.52
When humans are constrained by their times, their physical form nec-
essarily becomes tied up and their spirit depletes, thus they cannot 
49. In her influential 1966 essay, “Against Interpretation,” Susan Sontag said that 
“Real art has the capacity to make us nervous. By reducing the work of art to its content 
and then interpreting that, one tames the work of art. Interpretation makes art manage-
able, conformable.” Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation and Other Essays (New York: 
Picador, 1966), 8.
50. Gajo Petrović, “Reification,” in A Dictionary of Marxist Thought, ed. Tom Botto-
more, Laurence Harris, V. G. Kiernan and Ralph Miliband (Oxford: Blackwell Publish-
ers, 1983), 411.
51. On this issue see Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Constructions 
of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (London: Penguin, 1991; first edition 
1967), 106.
52. Huainan honglie jijie 淮南鴻烈集解, comm. Liu Wendian 劉文典 (Beijing: Zhong-
hua, 1989), 2.10b.
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avert weakness. That I can be bound and harnessed is necessarily 
because there is a fate that lies outside myself.
The “Mountain Tree” chapter in the Zhuangzi gives us another illus-
tration of the feature of externalization, as well as an indication of 
the opposition between what is considered a result of the works of 
Heaven and what is a result of fate. In the anecdote, a dignified Con-
fucius 仲尼 explains to his disciple Yan Hui 顏回 that “It is easy to 
be indifferent to the afflictions of Heaven, but difficult to be indiffer-
ent to the benefits of man.”53 Challenging natural situations such as 
food scarcity and extreme weather conditions are easily understood 
as the workings of Heaven and Earth, the “afflictions of Heaven,” 
in which humans knowingly play no role. For that reason, it is easy 
for humans to accept them without major drama. However, when it 
comes to social success, humans tend to attribute it all to themselves. 
Confucius argues that, in the same way that natural situations must be 
attributed to Heaven, satisfying social situations such as attainment 
of high rank positions and political success must be attributed to fate, 
not to human effort. However, this is more difficult to acknowledge, 
as people have a tendency to congratulate themselves for sociopolit-
ical outcomes:
始用四達，爵祿並至而不窮，物之所利乃非己也，吾命有在外者也。54
As soon as one is employed [in office], he succeeds in all four direc-
tions. Rank and emolument reach him together and without end. 
But what is benefiting things is not the self: our fate lies externally 
to us.
In the next section, I analyze in more detail a case of the “inner–outer” 
dichotomy in the Mengzi. In the Mengzi, external fate (wai 外) is the realm 
outside the subject (wo 我) where “seeking does not contribute to achiev-
ing,”55 that is to say, where the agent has no control whatsoever. In this 
and other early texts, fate becomes an externalized object that lies out-
side human interiority and outside human control. Being externalized 
and acting as an object in opposition to the subject, fate alienates the 
subject. The subject becomes separated from the external, objective, and 
opaque realm of fate, unable to interact with it. Withdrawn into himself, 
the subject is alienated from its own creation, which brings us to the 
third point.
53. Zhuangzi jijie 20.173.
54. Zhuangzi jijie 20.173.
55. Mengzi zhushu 7A/3.229b.
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DISENGAGEMENT AND ALIENATION
When fate is reified, the objective, external realm of fate is experienced 
as overpowering the subject. It seems like there is nothing the subject 
can do in the face of fate, apart from passively accepting it and stoically 
awaiting its charge. At the same time that fate becomes an impene-
trable, opaque object that cannot be interpreted or approached, the 
subject may become alienated from the world and from himself, which 
brings in disengagement. The belief in the existence of blind fate had 
manifold implications for human behavior. It left some people feeling 
powerless and frustrated: what are we supposed to do in the face of an 
uncontrollable, uncertain destiny? It could also make people careless 
and lazy in their undertakings: why would I try if everything depends 
on fate anyway?
Some early Chinese thinkers even considered this conception of fate 
the root of the main ethical and sociopolitical problems of their times, 
as it is the case of the Mozi. The thinkers behind the Mozi feared that 
people would blame everything on fate and would not do anything 
to ameliorate their lives. They were concerned that if common peo-
ple took personal failure and success, as well as the country’s state 
of peace and order, or war and chaos, as things beyond their control, 
they would not find motivation to conduct themselves ethically and to 
exert efforts to improve their condition.56 The belief in a reified, exter-
nalized notion of fate would cause a state of ontological slavery: a state 
of resignation in the face of situations and events that are considered 
inevitable or, as Nietzsche termed it, a “will to hibernation” without 
revolt.57 The idea of hibernation suggests the feelings of disengage-
ment and alienation of the person who experiences reality in this way, 
those for whom fate is a welcome absolution from the requirement to 
do anything.58
56. See the “Gong Meng” 公孟 chapter. Franklin Perkins notices that the Mohists’ 
major concern when attacking the belief of a preexisting and prescribed fate was to 
encourage their contemporaries to end war. See Perkins, Heaven and Earth are not 
Humane: The Problem of Evil in Classical Chinese Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 2014), 56.
57. Nietzsche analyzes different kinds of fatalism, among them the same one criti-
cized by the Mozi, and denounces the “will to hibernation” of those who have placed 
their fate externally and in opposition to the subject, feeling relieved and content to do 
nothing in the face of fate. Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One 
Is, trans. Duncan Large (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007; originally published 
1908), 1.6.
58. Peter Sloterdijk, Selected Exaggerations. Conversations and Interviews 1993–2012 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 302.
THE REIFICATION OF FATE IN EARLY CHINA 21
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/eac.2019.6
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 87.220.62.23, on 08 Jul 2019 at 08:06:45, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
For that reason, the authors of the Mozi would attempt to liberate the 
person from the slavery of fate by returning all power to the agent and 
reestablishing a retributory order. We find in the Mozi a world imbued 
with laws of causality and moral justice, where everyone gets what they 
cultivate. According to the Mozi, human history and everyday experi-
ence give us evidence enough to prove this theory. From history, we can 
see that virtuous rulers achieved the Mandate of Heaven whereas evil 
ones lost it. From ordinary experience, we can see that those who care 
for others are cared for in return, while those who hate are hated.59 The 
Mozi emphasizes that humans have power and control over what hap-
pens in their lives, and hence they must take responsibility for their own 
actions and their repercussions, instead of blaming it all on an uncon-
trollable fate. The authors of the Mozi considered the belief in a reified 
fate so dangerous that they set up a philosophical program to return all 
control to the agent.
The implications of the process of reification described above through 
the features of objectification, externalization, and disengagement made 
fate a problem, a problem that many early Chinese thinkers were com-
mitted to solve. Refuting the existence of fate was the Mozi’s denial 
strategy. Opening an inner realm of moral autonomy for the  subject is 
the proposal we find in texts such as Mengzi and the Guodian 郭店 
bamboo texts Tang Yu zhi dao 唐虞之道 and Qiongda yishi 窮達以時. 
Open-mindedly and adaptively accepting the new situations brought 
in by fate and taking advantage of them as new possibilities to create 
a good life was the solution proposed in texts such as the “dead dia-
logues” of the Zhuangzi. Acting in conformity to the natural order to the 
extent of dissolving human agency into nature is a strategy that allows 
for both efficacy and unaccountability in texts such as The Four Classics 
of the Yellow Emperor (Huangdi sijing 黃帝四經).60
The next section provides an illustrated analysis of the reification of 
fate as it takes place in two early Chinese texts that share the pattern of 
59. See, for instance, the third of the “Against fate” 非命 chapters, and the “Inclu-
sive Concern” 兼愛 triad. All the examples argue for a causal connection between 
actions and success or failure. Perkins’ Heaven and Earth are not Humane, 57, includes an 
interesting discussion on the Mohist argument against a fatalistic notion of fate.
60. In order to recover existential competence and deal with what seems to be 
beyond human control, some strategies should be designed. Which solutions did early 
Chinese thinkers propose to deal with the problem of a reified fate and the uncertainty 
that it produced? By which means did they recover their existential competence? 
I   discuss some of these solutions in “Beyond our Control? Two Responses to 
 Uncertainty and Fate in Early China,” in New Visions of the Zhuangzi, ed. Livia Kohn 
(St. Petersburg, FL: Three Pines Press, 2015), 1–22.
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thought of ming as a fate-object: the Mengzi 孟子 and the Guodian bam-
boo manuscript The Way of Tang and Yu.
Two Case Studies of Ming As Fate-Object: Mengzi and Tang 
Yu zhi Dao
Mengzi
In an article that deals with the conception of ming in the Mengzi and 
the Analects, Ted Slingerland gives the following definition of ming: 
“forces that lie in the outer realm—that is, the realm beyond the bounds 
of proper human endeavor, or the area of life in which ‘seeking does 
not contribute to one’s getting it.’”61 The spatial description of ming as 
the outer area in which “seeking does not contribute to one’s getting it” 
comes from Mengzi 7A.3:
孟子曰：求則得之，舍則失之，是求有益於得也，求在我者也。求之有
道，得之有命，是求無益於得也，求在外者也。62
Mengzi said: “When seeking, you obtain them; when neglecting, 
you lose them. This refers to a case in which seeking helps obtaining, 
because the seeking lies within oneself. The seeking is proper to the 
moral way, but the obtaining is nevertheless fated. This refers to a case 
in which seeking does not help obtaining, because the seeking lies out-
side oneself.”
Slingerland’s discussion, which closely follows the Mengzi’s classi-
fication of phenomena into what is within human control and what is 
not, interests me because of its emphasis on location. According to the 
Mengzi, within our control there is the exercise of our inborn virtues. 
That is the realm of interiority where “seeking helps obtaining.” The 
gentleman (junzi 君子) has the power to examine his interiority (nei xing 
內省) and correct his moral behavior accordingly. What makes the gen-
tleman, as well as an ordinary person, a proper human subject is the 
moral potency that lies within, and over which he can achieve control. In 
the Mengzi, the four inner virtues constitute the person’s subjective inte-
riority: what we really are, or rather, have the potential to become and 
the power to realize, as distinguished from what comes from outside 
and remains beyond our control.
61. Edward Slingerland, “The Conception of Ming in Early Confucian Thought,” 
Philosophy East and West 46.4 (1996), 568.
62. Mengzi zhushu 7A/3.229b.
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仁義禮智，非由外鑠我也，我固有之也 … 故曰：求則得之，舍則失
之。63
Humanity, righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom are not welded 
into me from the outside. I have them inherently … Hence it is said: 
“When seeking, you obtain them; when neglecting, you lose them.”
Opposed to the inner moral realm of the four virtues, which lies 
within our control, we find the outer, incontrollable, inexplicable realm 
of ming. The forces that exert influence in our lives belong to the outer 
realm, a realm that opposes our interiority and quality of subjects. In 
its identification with an independent and outer realm where human 
actions do not necessarily lead to the expected outcomes (where “seek-
ing does not contribute to obtaining it”), ming becomes objectified and 
externalized.
In the reifying pattern of thinking, ming is not only reified as an exter-
nal object that opposes the subject’s interiority and sphere of autono-
mous behavior, but it is also often construed as a negative, opposing 
object. The identification of the realm of personal interiority with that of 
morality by means of the four sprouts of virtue (si duan 四端)64 allows 
the external realm to be identified with the amoral. In modern Chinese 
scholarship, this dichotomy is expressed through the notions of how 
things are (shiran 實然, or descriptive reality) and how things should be 
(yingran 應然, or normative reality).65 External ming is the vast descrip-
tive realm of how things are; while the internal moral subject is the com-
paratively smaller but crucial normative realm of how things could and 
should be. The external realm is not necessarily immoral, but is often 
perceived as a detrimental limit, not conducive to the development of 
the normative pursuit of our inborn sprouts of morality.
Ming versus Xing: The Outer and the Inner
In the Mengzi, the tension between descriptive and normative reality, 
as well as between outer and inner realms, is expressed in terms of a 
dichotomy between ming (the external, incontrollable realm of fate) and 
xing 性 (the internal, controllable realm of human nature). The following 
passages are key to understand the dichotomy between ming and xing, 
63. Mengzi zhushu 6A.195a.
64. Mengzi zhushu 2A.66.
65. See, among others, Lao Siguang 勞思光, Xinbian Zhongguo zhexue shi 新編中國哲
學史, vol. 1 (Taipei: Sanmin, 1984), 197–99. Chen Zhengyang 陳政揚, “Mengzi yu 
Zhuangzi minglun yanjiu” 孟子與莊子命論研究, Jiedi 8 (2005), 138.
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and how ming is construed in a negative way as an external limitation to 
the person’s moral development and fulfilling life.
孟子曰 Mengzi said:
口之於味也 The mouth’s tendency towards [good] flavors,
目之於色也 the eye’s tendency towards [nice] colors,
耳之於聲也 the ear’s tendency towards [pleasant] sounds,
鼻之於臭也 the nose’s tendency towards [fragrant] odors,
四肢之於安佚也 the four limbs’ tendency towards ease and rest
性也 are all innate physical tendencies.
有命焉 Since fate is involved in [attaining] them,
君子不謂性也 the gentleman does not call them “human nature.”
仁之於父子也 The tendency of humanity towards fathers and sons,
義之於君臣也  the tendency of righteousness towards rulers and 
ministers,
禮之於賓主也  the tendency of ritual propriety towards guests and 
hosts,
智之於賢者也 the tendency of wisdom towards worthies,
聖人之於天道也 the tendency of the sage towards the way of Heaven
命也 are all [subject to] fate.
有性焉 Since human nature is involved in [sprouting] them,
君子不謂命也66 the gentleman does not call them “fate.”
Let us first pay attention to the formal features of these passages. We 
may understand these passages as a level of commentary inserted within 
the text. The commentator may be alluding to well-known debates about 
what must be consider inner and what must be considered outer, such 
as the one recorded in Mengzi 6A between Mencius and Gaozi 告子. The 
purpose of the passage is to explain why it is the case that “the gentle-
man” provides counterintuitive definitions of what belongs to the realm 
of “human nature” (xing) and what belongs to the realm of “fate” (ming).
The formal features also help us discern the concepts at use. It might 
be tempting to read the first xing 性 as qing 情 (emotions, conditions, ten-
dencies), given that it stands for sensorial tendencies and motivations 
such as the eye’s attraction towards colors.67 However, attention to the 
parallelism between the last three lines of each section clears the temp-
tation out and forces us to read the word as it appears in the transmitted 
text: xing 性. The structure of the three last lines in each section has a 
negative mirroring effect. In each case, we find a distinction between 
66. Mengzi zhushu 7B.253b.
67. Lisa Raphals reads it in this way in “Debates about Fate in Early China,” Études 
Chinoises 33.2 (2014), 27.
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what common sense would tell us that either human nature or fate is, 
and what the gentleman counterintuitively tells us they actually are. The 
author of this passage is making a rhetorical point trying to prove that 
the gentleman has insights that go contrary to what ordinary people 
think they know. However, the rhetorical point to present the gentle-
man as a counterintuitive thinker should not prevent us from taking 
seriously the redefinitions of the concepts of xing and ming that the text 
presents. The reason for the gentleman’s redefinition of the concepts of 
human nature and fate is also provided in these lines:
[Something seems to be] X [Something seems to be] Y
because of Y because of X
then not X then not Y
Sensory desires—what we can translate as “inborn physical tendencies” 
(the first “xing” in the quoted passage)—belong by common sense or 
conventional understanding to human nature. They seem to be part 
of our inner subjectivity, part of our inner self. However, in order to 
satisfy these impulses, tendencies, and desires—the passage argues—
the senses need to seek outside of themselves, which introduces them 
into the outer realm of ming, where “seeking does not help obtaining.” 
This is the reason provided by the text to explain why the gentleman 
does not consider physical tendencies to be part of human nature, or 
what we could better call “inborn moral tendencies” (the second use of 
xing).68
Ming is present as a potential obstacle to the fulfillment of inborn sen-
sory desires. As we saw before, what conforms the interiority that makes 
us human subjects is limited to what can be achieved by active seeking: 
what is within our control. Shifting the meaning of xing from inborn 
sensory tendencies and desires, common to all humans but also to other 
animals, to an inner space of moral tendencies specific to humankind, 
the gentleman is deciding the parameters that define us as exclusively 
human. In other words, the gentleman is the one qualified to decide 
what should be considered part of our human inner selves, and what 
should not. Those inborn tendencies and desires do not belong to the 
moral interiority that defines humans, not only because their satisfaction 
68. The distinction between the two uses of xing has often been noticed. Mou 
 Zongsan 牟宗三, Yuan shan lun 圓善論 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng, 1996), 151. Lin Qiping 
林啟屏, Cong gudian dao zhengdian: zhongguo gudai ruxue yishi zhi xingcheng 從古典到正
典：中國古代儒學意識之形成 (Taipei: Guoli Taiwan daxue, 2007), 276. Chen 
 Zhengyang, Mengzi yu Zhuangzi, 137–38.
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lies beyond our control, but also because they do not contribute towards 
the development of a moral personality.69
Let us now look at the other side of the mirroring parallel. Com-
mon sense and conventional understanding inform us that activities 
that involve the practice of virtuous behavior are subjected to different 
aspects of fate: luck, timing, and appropriate encounters, among oth-
ers. Even under the right circumstances, it is never certain that a person 
who practices the virtues will be reciprocated with an equally correct 
treatment. Therefore, interpersonal ethical behavior should be thought 
to belong to the realm of what lies outside of our control, the realm of 
ming. Nevertheless, the gentleman knows that the practice of virtuous 
conduct is rooted in the inner virtues, which are part of our inviolable 
interiority. As the quoted passage reads, xing is involved in the sprout-
ing of these virtuous tendencies. That is the reason why the gentleman 
advises that, despite the fact that the practice of morally correct behavior 
does not always entail a successful outcome for the virtuous person, 
these activities must be considered a part of xing in the sense of what 
makes us specifically human. In qualifying these activities governed by 
fate as part of human nature, the gentleman is reclaiming them to the 
inner realm of what is within our control.
In reading ming as an external limitation to our inner selves, I follow 
scholars such as Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Lin Qiping 林啟屏, Lao Siguang 
勞思光 and Liang Tao 梁濤.70 They all offer slightly different interpreta-
tions to this Mengzi passage, but generally agree that fate (ming) plays 
the role of objective reality that limits the fulfillment of the subject (xing) 
from the outside. There is a clear dichotomy between ming and xing, out-
side and inside, in this Mengzi passage. The dichotomy works towards 
creating a counterintuitive understanding of the realms of ming and xing. 
Where ordinary people would assume that inborn sensory desires and 
tendencies are inherent to the person and part of our nature (xing), at the 
same time that interpersonal moral tendencies and ethical behavior are 
affected by the external operation of fate (ming), the Mengzi’s gentleman 
rectifies these notions. Keeping the spatial image, he gives improved 
definitions of the realms of personal interiority and the  external effects 
of fate by redesigning their boundaries.
As we saw earlier in the discussion of ming as life span, and as we can 
see from our discussion of the Mengzi passage, even matters so intuitively 
69. See Mou, Yuan shan lun, 151. Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, Zhongguo renxinglun shi –Xian 
Qin pian 中國人性論史—先秦篇 (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu, 1999), 167–68.
70. See Mou, Yuan shan lun, 151. Lin, Cong gudian dao zhengdian, 276. Lao, Xinbian 
Zhongguo zhexue shi, 197–99. Liang Tao 梁濤, Guodian zhujian yu Si Meng xuepai 郭店竹
簡與思孟學派 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue, 2008), 454–55.
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close to our individuality and that we usually construct as intimate, such 
as our life span, our desires, tendencies, temperament, character, and dis-
position, once they became attributed to ming, were reified and construed 
as external limitations imposed on the subject from the outside. What is 
the subject then? The subject is reduced to the part of us that can make 
moral choices and has the power to control those choices: our moral inner 
self. We can decide how to think, act, and react in situations with a moral 
component, and we have the power to cultivate our virtue. This is the 
world of human interiority that was created against an external world of 
confronting, limiting, and hostile reality.71 But what exactly constitutes 
this world of limiting reality, the world of ming?
Ming versus Heaven: Two Kinds of Agency
From the analysis of the dichotomy between xing and ming we have 
learned that the Mengzi construed ming as an amoral, detrimental object. 
In the following, and in order to better understand what is ming, we 
will direct our attention to the similarities and differences that we find 
between tian and ming, Heaven and fate, in the Mengzi. Let us begin by 
reviewing the literature.
According to Chen Ning, the forces of ming in the Mengzi include both 
Heaven’s decisions, which are always moral, and a sort of blind, amoral 
fate.72 When ming is Heaven’s moral commands, it resonates with our 
own moral interiority (our human nature), and we take on them with 
pleasure. When, on the contrary, the ming we face is the lashes of a blind 
and amoral destiny, we rather withdraw to ourselves and find autonomy 
in our moral behavior. In both cases, the person cannot but accept ming. 
Tang Junyi 唐君毅 and Lin Meiling 林玫玲 have proposed similar argu-
ments. In their view, apart from an undeniable sense of ming as exter-
nal limitation to our power, there is in the Mengzi a distinct meaning 
of ming as moral command coming from Heaven. Being in consonance 
with our moral nature, this moral command does not impose a limit 
but works as a guide for our ethical behavior.73 The proponents of this 
71. Some scholars have expressed this conflict in the Mengzi in terms of a difference 
between ming understood as mingxian 命限 (external limitations) and ming understood 
as li ming 立命 (the fate that one establishes for oneself by following a moral path). See 
Chen Zhengyang, Mengzi yu Zhuangzi, 144. We go back to the idea of li ming at the end 
of this section.
72. Chen Ning, “The Concept of Fate in Mencius,” Philosophy East and West 97.4 
(1997), 495. And Chen Ning, Zhongguo gudai mingyunguan de xiandai quanshi 中國古代
命運觀的現代詮釋 (Shenyang: Liaoning jiaoyu, 1999), 131–32.
73. Tang Junyi, Zhongguo zhexue lun –daolun pian 中國哲學原論─導論篇 (Taipei: 
Taiwan xuesheng, 1993), 526–27. Lin Meiling, Xian Qin zhexue de minglun sixiang, 228.
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second meaning of ming in the Mengzi want to reconcile the dichotomy 
between our inner moral selves (xing) and Heaven’s external commands 
(ming) that we have previously seen.74 When ming involves a moral com-
mand coming from Heaven, it finds resonance in our inner morality to 
the extent that there is no differentiation between what we are morally 
predisposed to do (xing), and what Heaven requires us to do (ming).
Michael Puett, on the other hand, has argued that there is only one 
meaning of ming in the Mengzi: Heaven’s decisions. Nevertheless, Puett 
points out, Heaven’s decisions need not always be moral. They are often 
inscrutable and can even be straightforwardly against the moral plan 
that Heaven itself conceived for humanity in the first place.75 Puett uses 
as example Mengzi 2B/13, where a tragic Mencius speaks of the cycli-
cal pattern of sagely rulership conceived by Heaven. Every five hun-
dred years a true king has arisen, and during that time, a person that we 
could call a sage because of his capacity to bring peace and order to the 
world has appeared. Mencius complains that it has already been seven 
hundred years since the first Zhou rulers, and no true king or sage has 
arisen yet. According to Mencius, he should be the one appointed for 
this task, yet his projects as royal advisor have all been a failure. This can 
only be, Mencius complains, because Heaven does not yet wish to bring 
peace and order to All under Heaven (夫天，未欲平治天下也).76 Puett 
concludes that the ambiguity in the term ming is not due to it having 
different meanings, but it is rather a reflection of the ambiguity felt in 
face of the relationship between the person and Heaven. Heaven created 
the moral patterns that should govern the person and the world yet, for 
unknown reasons, it not always worked in favor of those patterns.77
I would like to propose a different way of looking at the relation-
ship between tian and ming in the Mengzi. On one hand, I agree with 
74. Scholars holding the unifying view promote the slogan “xing ming heyi” 性命合一. 
For evidence that ming, and xing are not in opposition in the Mengzi, we must turn to 
revelatory passages in texts such as Zhongyong 中庸 and Xing zi ming chu 性自命出. See, 
for instance, Yao Yanqi 姚彥淇, “Mengzi ‘xingming duiyang’ zhang yiyun zaitan” 孟子
「性命對揚」章義蘊再探, electronic publication at Guoli Gaoxiong Shifan daxue, www.
nknu.edu.tw/∼jingxue/download/99jingpdf/011.pdf, 2010, 8. This line of argumenta-
tion is based on the assumption that all these texts belong to the same branch of Confu-
cianism coming from Mencius and Zi Sizi 子思子 and share the same philosophical 
worldview, hence we can use the one in support of the other. A different methodology is 
used by scholars such as Fu Sinian and, more recently, Chen Zhengyang, who argue for 
the unifying view based only in textual evidence found in the Mengzi. See Fu Sinian, Fu 
Mengzhen xiansheng ji, 355–56; and Chen Zhengyang, Mengzi yu Zhuangzi.
75. Michael Puett, “Following the Commands of Heaven: The Notion of ming in 
Early China,” in The Magnitude of Ming, ed. Lupke, 50–53 and 56–57.
76. Mengzi zhushu 2B.85a.
77. Puett, “Following the Commands of Heaven,” 59–61.
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Chen, Tang, and Lin that ming sometimes refers to commands of 
Heaven, and insofar they come from Heaven, these commands are 
moral. This is the case when the word ming is short for tian ming 
(“heaven’s mandate” when applied to the sage or the king, and 
“heaven’s commands” when applied to everyone else). It is my con-
tention, however, that the meaning of ming when it is short for tian 
ming must be distinguished from the meaning of ming when it refers 
to the blind and external force of fate. In the same way that we distin-
guish the verb ming when it stands for “giving an order” (wang ming 
王命/jun ming 君命, Mengzi) or “replying” (fan ming 反命 Mengzi), we 
need to differentiate between the moral, Heavenly command, and the 
amoral forces of fate.
On the other hand, I agree with Puett that in the Mengzi Heaven does 
not always act in the moral or ethical way that it is expected to. How-
ever, I must disagree with the idea that there is only one meaning of ming 
in the Mengzi, which according to Puett would be Heaven’s decisions. 
As pointed out before, ming is a polyvalent word, and it is used in the 
Mengzi as well as in other early texts with a variety of meanings, which 
include command, order, reply, life, mandate, and fate. The ambivalence 
of ming certainly is due to its polysemic character, and to the way in 
which early authors consciously or unconsciously dealt with its multi-
plicity of meanings.
In the following I propose to pay attention to several formal and liter-
ary aspects of the passages that make reference to Heaven and ming in 
order to clarify the difference between these two important concepts, as 
well as to better understand the reification of ming.
In his study of the Mengzi and Confucian ethics, Shun Kwong-loi 
points out that Heaven, much as ming, is credited with things over 
which we have no power.78 Heaven in the Mengzi shares with ming in 
being a source of explanation for what we cannot explain and what lies 
beyond our control. Both Heaven and ming are a sort of agency that 
make things happen or not. They are both heteronomous forces, namely 
external forces that influence the person from the outside and threaten 
the person’s autonomy and self-determination. Nevertheless, and this is 
the most important point, Heaven is expected to be moral in the Mengzi, 
while ming is not.
78. Shun, Kwong-loi, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1997), 77–78. This is certainly the case in the Mengzi. “Liang Hui 
wang B,” for instance, says that a king must do whatever efforts that will ensure his 
people inherit a better world, but “whether he is able to accomplish it or not, lies with 
Heaven” (若夫成功，則天也) (Mengzi zhushu 2B.46).
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We find a multiplicity of expressions that attribute morality to Heaven 
in the Mengzi. Some of these expressions are indirect. For instance, 
“Gongsun Chou A” implies that Heaven is a moral entity by claiming 
that the king who behaves according to the five moral precepts becomes 
a minister of Heaven (tian li 天吏).79 In turn, “Gongsun Chou B” uses the 
notion of the minister of Heaven to claim moral authority over war and 
conquest: only the minister of Heaven can justly smite another kingdom, 
in the same way that only a chief criminal judge can justly judge people.80 
Other expressions are more direct. Several chapters directly attribute 
virtues to Heaven making it be the source of human morality.81 Finally, 
several passages show that Heaven has moral character, that it has 
agency, and that it responds to people’s actions.82 In Mengzi 4A, Heaven 
is made a retributive and moral agent that gives the throne to the vir-
tuous ones and enables the defeat of those who lack virtue (ideology of 
the Mandate of Heaven).83 A correspondence between human behavior 
and Heaven’s actions is expected. For instance, in Mengzi 1B we learn 
that Heaven will surely send down punitive calamities against a king 
who does not conquer an evil state (不取，必有天殃).84 This behavior 
can only be expected when Heaven is considered a moral agent that 
responds to human action according to an ethical standard.
The fact that Heaven is considered a moral agent, and that it is 
expected to keep to certain ethical standards, implies that, when 
Heaven does not act by those standards, humans can feel discontent, 
angry, frustrated, and lost. This is exactly what happens to Mencius in 




When Mencius left Qi, on the journey Chong Yu questioned him, 
 saying: “Master, you seem to carry an air of dissatisfaction in your 
countenance. But formerly I heard you say, ‘The gentleman does not 
complain against Heaven, nor blame men’.”
79. Mengzi zhushu 2A.65a.
80. Mengzi zhushu 2B.80b.
81. Mengzi zhushu 2A.66b; 3A.98b; 6A.204b.
82. See, for instance, Mengzi 1B.31–32, 43a.
83. Mengzi 4A.124 says that the calamity of a kingdom is not to not be able to protect 
itself with big walls against enemies, but to be lacking in virtue, because then Heaven 
will enable its defeat. Along the same lines, Mengzi 5A.168–171 explains that Heaven 
gave the throne to Shun because, unlike the Shang king, Shun was virtuous.
84. Mengzi 1B.222.
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Mencius said: “That was one time, and this is another.86 It is a rule that 
a [sage] king should arise in the course of five hundred years, and that 
during that time there should be men illustrious in their generation. 
From the beginning of the Zhou dynasty until now, more than seven 
hundred years have elapsed. Judging numerically, the date is past. 
Examining the character of the present time, we should expect the rise 
of such individuals in it. But Heaven does not yet wish to bring peace 
and order to All under Heaven. If it wished to bring peace and order to 
All under Heaven, in today’s world who is there besides me [to do it]? 
How should I be [otherwise than] dissatisfied?”87
The keywords in this dialogue are bu yu 不豫, which means to feel 
discontent, dissatisfied, or displeased; and yuan tian 怨天, which is 
to complain or murmur against Heaven. The structure of the story is 
very simple: in theory, one should never complain against Heaven.88 
85. Mengzi zhushu 2B.85a.
86. I follow Mengzi commentators in their interpretation of this line. The persona of 
Mencius would be contrasting the time when he said the sentence that his disciple 
Chong Yu attributes to him (“The gentleman does not complain against Heaven, nor 
blame men”), and the present time in which the conversation takes place, during Men-
cius’ trip to Qi to deal with a chaotic political situation. See Mengzi zhengyi 孟子正義, 
vol. 1, ed. Jiao Xun 焦循 (Taipei: Zhonghua, 2009), 309. Due to the current situation, 
Mencius cannot help feeling discontentment. The same happens to the Confucius of 
the Analects in several occasions. For instance, when his beloved Yan Yuan 顏淵 died, 
Confucius cried out “Alas! Heaven has abandoned me, Heaven has abandoned me!” 
(噫天喪予天喪予) (Lun yü zhushu 11.97a).
87. This is a contended passage, as it is difficult to accept that Mencius could  complain 
against Heaven. I follow Mengzi commentators in their understanding of this last line as 
an explanation of why Mencius should feel dissatisfied (我所以有不豫，為­此也). The 
logic is that Mencius will stop feeling dissatisfied when Heaven decides that it is a 
good time to stop chaos and charges Mencius with achieving this task. See Mengzi 
zhengyi, vol. 1, 311.
88. The phrase, 不怨天不尤人 (“not to complain against Heaven or to grudge 
against men”), also appears in Analects 14.35, where it is attributed to Confucius. 
Same phrasing in Lun heng jiaoshi 30.457; Shi ji 17 “Kongzi shi jia” 孔子世家; Shuoyuan 
jinzhu jinyi 說苑今註今譯, ed. Lu Yuanjun 盧元駿 (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu, 
1977), 14.475. Zhongyong zhushu 中庸注疏 52.883b contains the sentence with a varia-
tion: 上不怨天，下不尤人 (“Above, [the gentleman] does not complain against 
Heaven; below, he does not grudge against men”). Also with a variation, in Xunzi jishi 
荀子集釋, ed. Li Disheng 李滌生 (Taipei: Xuesheng, 1979), 4: 59: 自知者不怨人，知命者
不怨天 (“Those who know themselves do not complain against men, and those who 
understand fate do not complain against Heaven”).
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 However, Mencius qualifies, there are circumstances that allow for 
the person to feel discontent and complain: when Heaven seems to act 
against ethical principles.
We find a similar anecdote in Mengzi 5A. It is parallel to the previous 
dialogue in vocabulary and structure, with the difference that the object 
of complaint and dissatisfaction is one’s parents, instead of Heaven:
萬章問曰：舜往于田，號泣于旻天，何為其號泣也？
Wan Zhang asked Mencius, saying: “When Shun went into the fields, 
he cried out and wept towards compassionate Heaven. Why did he cry 
out and weep?”
孟子曰：怨慕也。
Mencius replied: “He was dissatisfied, and full of earnest desire.”
萬章曰：父母愛之，喜而不忘；父母惡之，勞而不怨。然則舜怨乎？89
Wan Zhang said: “When his parents love him, a son rejoices and forgets 
them not. When his parents hate him, though they punish him, he does 
not complain. Was Shun then complaining against his parents?”
Then Mengzi proceeds to explain to Wan Zhang how it can be the case 
that Shun could not help but feel sorrow and express his complaints 
against his parents. Shun exerted himself in all spheres of life, first to 
cultivate the fields, then to govern the world. Yet Shun’s parents did not 
consider him worthy of love. No matter how correctly Shun behaved 
and how successful he became in political matters, he could never 
achieve his parents’ acceptance and support. Mengzi explains that a fil-
ial son will always need his parents to be in accord with him (shun 順). 
Despite enjoying the pleasures of beauty, sensuality, riches, and honors 
(hao se fu gui 好色富貴), as a filial son who feels unappreciated and unde-
serving of parental love, Shun could not liberate himself from sorrow (jie 
you 解憂) to the end of his days.90
The keywords in this story are yuan mu 怨慕, dissatisfied and full of 
earnest desire; yuan (fumu) 怨 (父母), to complain or murmur [against 
parents]; you 憂, sorrow; and min tian 旻天, which we can translate as 
“compassionate Heaven.”91 Note that these words express ideas similar 
89. Mengzi zhushu 5A.160a.
90. See the rest of the story in Mengzi 5A.160a–161a.
91. Shuo wen jiezi reads: 仁閔覆下，則稱旻天 (“It covers everything below with 
humanity and compassion, therefore it is called ‘compassionate Heaven’”). Shuo wen 
footnote continued on next page
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to those we found in the previous story: they point at a dissatisfied per-
son sorrowed by ethical injustice who complains against the source of his 
unhappiness. The structure also parallels the dialogue where Mencius 
complains against Heaven: in theory, one should not complain against 
one’s parents, but there are circumstances that allow it. Notably, the 
fact that one’s parents behave in what seems an unloving way towards 
their filial son. Both stories showcase people who are frustrated, sad, 
and angry against an unsympathetic, unfair superior authority that they 
respect and love, and of whom they would expect an ethical behavior 
that is missing. The parallel between the two anecdotes becomes even 
stronger when we realize that early texts often qualify Heaven and Earth 
as the parents of the ten thousand types of things.92 Heaven takes the 
role of a father in its relationship with humans. The parallelism between 
Heaven and a father is clear in the two stories. In the first dialogue, Men-
cius admits he is discontent and frustrated by Heaven’s behavior. In the 
second, Mencius justifies that Shun could be discontent and sorrowed 
by his parents’ behavior. The people need and expect Heaven’s moral 
guidance, acceptance, and support, much as a filial son needs his par-
ent’s love and recognition. Note also that the story about Shun’s sorrow 
begins by making reference to his crying out to a compassionate Heaven 
(min tian 旻天). Contrary to Laozi’s famous statement “Heaven and Earth 
are not humane” (tiandi bu ren 天地不仁),93 the Heaven of the Mengzi is 
a moral entity that is expected to display humanity and righteousness 
in its behavior.94
Ming-fate, on the contrary, is not expected to display a moral or eth-
ical behavior. Therefore, the human attitude towards ming will be dif-
ferent from the attitude towards Heaven. Fate can also cause all sorts of 
jiezi zhu 說文解字注, attributed to Xu Shen 許慎, comm. Duan Yucai 段玉裁 (Shanghai: 
Shanghai guji, 1988), 8.46.
92. The epithet “Son of Heaven” for the ruling king suggests that Heaven acts as a 
father for the ruler. Beyond the ruler’s kinship with Heaven (symbolic or otherwise), 
there are numerous textual examples of the representation of Heaven and Earth as 
father and mother of the people and all entities (min 民/ wanwu 萬物). See, among 
others, Shang shu zhushu 1A.152b; Zhuangzi jijie 6.58; Guanzi jinzhu jinyi 41.703; Huainan 
honglie jijie 7.1b; and Heguanzi 鶡冠子, ed. Lu Dian 陸佃 (Taipei: Taiwan zhonghua, 
1965), 10.80.
93. Laozi Daode jing zhu jiaoshi 老子道德經注校釋, ed. Lou Yulie 樓宇烈 (Beijing: 
Zhonghua, 2008), 185.
94. In his book named after the famous Laozi phrase, “Heaven and Earth are not 
Humane,” Perkins discusses these Mengzi passages to explore the issue of “Heaven’s 
role in the world” (Perkins, Heaven and Earth are not Humane, 122). However, he reaches 
the opposite conclusion: “Mengzi has come to equate heaven with fate, ming. Heaven 
simply represents those forces or events in the world that are inexplicable and irresist-
ible” (p. 123; the idea comes up again on p. 127).
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 unethical, undeserved, and unfair outcomes, yet there is no point in feel-
ing discontent and anger, and certainly there is no point in complaining. 
One can be mad at Heaven because Heaven is an intentional, subjective, 
and moral agency. However, one cannot be mad at ming because fate is 
an objective and amoral power: fate is reified as an opaque object that, 
differently from the personified Heaven, does not admit communica-
tion, intersubjectivity, or any sort of interpersonal transactions.
The features of the reifying pattern of thought, where fate is reified 
as an object, are visible in the semantic field that accompanies ming in 
texts that share this worldview. In the Mengzi, ming is something to await 
(si ming 俟命), accompany in harmony (pei ming 配命), accept (shun shou 
順受), stand on (li ming 立命), understand (zhi ming 知命), or simply have 
(you ming 有命).95 All these verbs that accompany ming in the Mengzi con-
firm that ming is seen as an external object beyond the subject’s control 
and emphasize its inevitability. At the same time, they imply that the 
subject must show a particular behavior towards this inevitability. As 
opposed to the attitude one must have towards Heaven, which allows in 
certain situations for dissatisfaction and complaint, the correct attitude 
toward ming is one of acceptance and understanding. The emphasis on 
accepting and understanding also implies that the object in question is 
not always easy to accept and understand yet we must make the effort. 
This difference in attitude suggests that the authors of the Mengzi consid-
ered the power of Heaven and the power of fate to be two distinct things.
Standing on Ming: A Solution to the Problem of Fate
The fact that, as opposed to Heaven, which accepts communication 
(and may even be compassionate), fate is a sort of objective, external, 
opaque force with which humanity cannot negotiate, introduced a 
problem in the relationship between the person and the world. As we 
have seen before in the study of the dichotomy between ming and xing, 
the  Mengzi’s gentleman redefined what belongs to the external realm 
beyond our control and what belongs to the inner realm of what makes 
us properly human. This redefinition had two practical consequences. 
First, reintroducing interpersonal ethical behavior within the realm of 
what is within our control gave the ordinary person motivation to keep 
acting correctly, disallowing self-defeating and lazy behavior. Even 
though the consequences of one’s actions could not always be foreseen 
and remained governed by external fate, one could and should be in 
95. I only consider the cases where ming means fate. When ming is used as “com-
mand” or “order” in the Mengzi, the most common verb is “receive” (shou 受), but this 
is irrelevant to my analysis.
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control of his own actions and thoughts. At the same time, eliminating 
inborn sensory desires from the definition of human nature eliminated 
distractions and helped the person focus on morality as the only thing 
that matters as a human.96
The solution that the Mengzi proposed to the problem of fate was to 
do what is right regardless of the outcomes. In other words, the person 
should not worry about the workings of ming but concentrate only on 
his virtuous behavior. For instance, in Mengzi 5A/8, Mencius explains 
that 孔子進以禮，退以義，得之不得曰有命 “Confucius advanced 
according to propriety and retired according to righteousness. Whether 
he obtained [office] or not, he said, was a matter of fate.”97 The teaching 
of this passage, as it faces the problem of a reified, opaque, inhumane, 
incomprehensible object of fate, is that one should always act in a virtu-
ous way (moral behavior is within human control) and stoically accept 
the outcomes of one’s actions whatever they are (the outcomes belong 
to the realm of fate, what is beyond human control).98
In my view, Confucius’ behavior, in the way it is explained by Men-
cius in the extract above, is an instance of “standing on ming” (li ming 
立命), namely relying on one’s fate as it comes and whatever it is. See 
Mencius’ statement below:
孟子曰： 殀壽不貳，修身以俟之，所以立命也。99
Mencius said: “Not allowing that either a premature death or a long 
life causes double-mindedness, and cultivating oneself while awaiting 
[whatever may happen], this is the way to stand on fate.”
I follow commentators and modern scholars in translating er 貳 as 
 “double-mindedness,” what we could understand as a kind of moral 
doubt. Not having duplicity means not to hesitate to follow the proper 
moral way even when facing challenging circumstances.100 The person 
who does not deviate from morality and continues cultivating himself 
(xiu shen 修身) while awaiting the charges of fate regardless what they 
96. Following Ivanhoe and Schwartz, Back has argued that the Ru 儒 perceived the 
world in moral terms and separated it into two domains: one morally relevant (where 
there is a causal connection between moral actions and non-moral outcomes, such as 
external goods), and one morally irrelevant (where such connection does not exist). 
According to Back, ming would be the line separating these two domains, a relational 
concept that expresses the interrelation between humans and Heaven. See Back, “Han-
dling Fate: The Ru Discourse on Ming,” 13–14.
97. Mengzi zhushu 5A.8.
98. Shun also remarks this point. Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 79.
99. Mengzi zhushu 7A.228b.
100. Mengzi Zhengyi, vol. 2, 878. Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 79–80.
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bring about is said to “stand on ming.” I do not follow commentators and 
most of modern scholars in my understanding of “standing on ming,” 
as they reduce the spectrum of ming to that of tian ming, Heaven’s man-
date. For instance, Zhu Xi interprets “standing on ming” as cultivating 
oneself as to complete our heavenly moral endowments and do not harm 
them through humanly imposed actions (謂全其天之所付，不以人為害
之).101 According to my analysis, Heaven and fate are two different kinds 
of agency. Heaven imposes on the person its own kind of ming, but ming 
is not reduced in the Mengzi (or in other early texts) to the workings of 
Heaven. Shun has proposed that the difference between Heaven and ming 
is that “the former emphasizes the source of things due not to human effort 
and the latter the outcome of such things.”102 While this is certainly the case 
in the passages where ming is short for tian ming, in numerous other occa-
sions ming is a force of its own, an independent agency, often responsible 
for allotting living beings’ life span, among other outcomes. When ming 
is reified as the object of fate, it is a nonsubjective, opaque, unreachable 
agency, as opposed to Heaven, which is a subjective agency. As we have 
seen above, the Mengzi introduces a difference in attitude toward Heaven 
and ming when the latter stands for a reified fate. “Standing on fate” is part 
of the correct attitude to show toward fate: it is a way of appropriation of 
one’s fate, a way of taking control over one’s life by keeping up with the 
moral path while accepting one’s lot without question or regret.
About the Mengzi and the Analects, Slingerland remarks that “the moti-
vation informing these texts is the desire to change people’s views of what 
is and what is not important, to redirect people’s energy and efforts from 
the external realm to the internal realm of self-cultivation.”103 A second 
motivation is the psychological function of providing peace to a troubled 
mind. Since what happens lies beyond our control, and there is nothing 
we can do about it, it should not trouble us. As long as the person is sure 
to be acting correctly in a moral way, she can live at peace with anything 
that happens in her life, no matter how unfair or dramatic it appears to 
be. This attitude requires continuous self-reflection and self-rectification: 
a search of the conditions for a worthy life within oneself.
To recapitulate, the Mengzi has given us a clear illustration of the 
 reifying pattern of thinking about the relationship between the person 
and the world in early China. In this pattern, ming is hypostasized as 
something independent and external to the subject; it is reified as an object 
that opposes or thwarts the subject; acting from the exterior, it entails an 
amoral limit and a threat to human moral interiority; and it is potentially 
101. Mengzi Zhengyi, vol. 2, 878.
102. Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 77.
103. Slingerland, “The Conception of Ming,” 576.
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detrimental to the subject, so it requires human reaction and psychologi-
cal resolution. In the next section, we see the same features of the reifica-
tion of fate in a different early Chinese text, The Way of Tang and Yu.
Tang Yu zhi Dao
Once we have extracted the features of the pattern of thought of ming as 
fate-object, it is easier to see this pattern repeatedly appear in early texts, 
both received and found. There is a phrasal structure that establishes 
that “those who understand fate do not feel sorrow” (知命者不憂).104 We 
see it in the Wenzi, with a parallel in Huainanzi “Quanyan” 詮言:
道者直己而待命。。。福之至非己之所求，故不伐其功，禍之來非己之
所生，故不悔其行。。。故通道者不惑，知命者不憂。105
The way consists in straightening oneself and awaiting fate … The 
arrival of fortune is not because one has sought it, so do not brag about 
its achievement. The arrival of misfortune is not because one has cre-
ated it, so do not regret its course … Therefore, those who comprehend 
the way are not confused, and those who understand fate do not worry.
As we have learned from the parallel dialogues in the previous section, 
one may rightfully feel sorrow in the face of Heaven, but not in the face 
of fate. What comes from fate is nothing to feel anxious or to complain 
about, since fate is not an ethical subjective entity. In this regard, the Liezi 
列子 offers additional insights:
死生自命也，貧窮自時也。怨夭折者，不知命者也；怨貧窮者，不知時
者也。當死不懼，在窮不戚，知命安時也.106
Death and life spring from fate; poverty and exhaustion spring from the 
times. Those who complain about premature death are those who do 
not understand fate. Those who complain against poverty and exhaus-
tion are those who do not understand the times. Not being afraid of 
death and not being distressed by hardship, that’s understanding fate 
and being content with the times.
104. Huainan honglie jijie 14: 17b; Wenzi zuanyi 4: 10a. In the form of zhiming buyou 知
命不憂, see Shi ji “Qu Yuan Jia sheng liezhuan” 屈原賈生列傳 in Shi ji, attributed to 
Sima Qian 司馬遷 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1959), 2500; and Han shu, “Jia Yi zhuan” 賈誼傳 
in Xin jiaoben Han shu jizhu bing fubian erzhong 新校本漢書集注并附編二種, ed. Yang 
Jialuo 楊家駱 (Taipei: Dingwen, 1976), 2228. In the Xici shang 繫辭上, we find 樂天知
命，故不優 “rejoices in Heaven and understands fate, therefore has no anxieties.” See 
Zhou yi zhushu 周易注疏 (Xici shang 繫辭上, 147b).
105. Wenzi zuanyi 4: 9b–10a.
106. Liezi jishi 6.6: 212.
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“Understanding fate,” the person is free from sorrow and distress 
toward what is beyond her control, therefore can concentrate efforts 
and energy in improving her moral behavior. This is probably what the 
Master in one of the Lun yü’s 論語 aphorisms meant by describing the 
gentleman as free from sorrow and fear:
子曰：君子不憂不懼。曰：不憂不懼，斯謂之君子已乎？子曰：內省不
疚，夫何憂何懼？107
The Master said: “The gentleman has neither anxiety nor fear.” [Niu] 
asked: “No anxiety and no fear, is this what makes a gentleman?” The 
Master replied: “When inner examination discovers nothing wrong, 
what is there to be anxious about, what is there to fear?”
“Understanding fate” (zhi ming) is a particularly important topos in the 
pattern of thought of ming as fate-object. We find this topos in many early 
texts such as Xunzi, Shuoyuan, Liezi, Wenzi, Huainanzi, and Lüshi Chun-
qiu, to name just a few. The notion of “understanding fate” is normally 
associated with the reification, externalization, and problematization of 
fate in early China. I include an example from a manuscript that was 
found at Guodian in 1993, and which has stirred up much attention.
The Way of Tang and Yu is a relatively short argumentative text that 
defends abdication and government by merit, as opposed to hereditary 
monarchy, as the best political option.108 What is interesting for me here 
is how it reflects the reifying pattern of thought of ming as fate-object. 
In The Way of Tang and Yu we find the same pattern that we have seen 
in the Mengzi: (1) Dichotomy and relationship of opposition between 
an inner subject and an external object; (2) Fate presented as a limiting, 
opposing object; (3) Fate presented as often detrimental to the subject; 
(4)  Therefore, fate presented as a problem.
In the bamboo text, we see a clear differentiation between the 
inner realm of things that are under the subject’s control, such as 
107. Lun yü zhushu 12.106b.
108. The manuscript was first published in Guodian Chumu zhujian 郭店楚墓竹簡, 
ed. Jingmenshi bowuguan 荊門市博物館 (Beijing: Wenwu, 1998), 39–41 and 157–59. For 
an English analysis of the material features of the manuscript and the intellectual con-
tent of The Way of Tang and Yu, see Scott Cook, The Bamboo Texts of Guodian: A Study and 
Complete Translation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), vol. 1, 521–64. Sarah 
Allan discusses The Way of Tang and Yu, together with other manuscripts from the War-
ring States period, in terms of their strong advocacy for political abdication. According 
to Allan, other narratives of abdication are found in the transmitted “Yao dian” 藥典 
chapter of the Documents, Mengzi 5A “Wan zhang shang” 萬章上, and the “Shang xian” 
尚賢 trilogy of the Mozi, as well as in the found texts Rongchengshi 容成氏, Zigao 子羔 
and Bao xun 保訓. See Sarah Allan, Buried Ideas: Legends of Abdication and Ideal Govern-
ment in Early China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015).
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self-cultivation in the virtues, and the external realm of ming: the objec-
tive, larger world of events that inevitably happen and affect the sub-
ject’s life. According to The Way of Tang and Yu, the mythical emperor 
Tang Yao’s 唐堯 abdication to Yu Shun 虞舜 was due to numerous fac-
tors, which can be divided into two categories. The first category of 
factors belongs to the inner realm of Shun’s virtue: he had been shown 
to be humane (ren 仁) and sagely (sheng 聖), filial (xiao 孝) and loyal 
(zhong 忠). Yao knew that these qualities would make him a good ruler 
for All under Heaven ([知其能]為民主也).109 According to the text, Shun 
achieved these qualities through self-cultivation. They belong to his 
inner self, the realm that remains within the subject’s control under 
all circumstances. This is indeed the author’s key argument in favor of 
abdication. Sagely government is based on the premise that the person 
is able to cultivate a correct moral behavior, and only then he will be 
prepared to bring order to the world. Hence the throne should only 
pass to the person who has already accomplished such virtuous merit. 
In the author’s words,
必正其身，然後正世，聖道備矣 (Guodian 39: 3)110
He must correct his own person and only then correct his generation.111 
The way of the sage is thus completed.
The second category of factors involved in the making of a legitimate 
ruler belongs to the external realm, the one that is outside human con-
trol. Heaven and Earth, and the world of numinous beings, are forces 
alien to the subject; they are objective and necessary, not susceptible to be 
changed by human agency. They all have determining influence over the 
course of events. All the elements that jointly play the role of fate, namely 
Heaven and Earth, natural elements such as mountains and rivers, and 
ancestors and other numinous beings, are treated as spirits or gods that 
109. Guodian Chumu zhujian, 158. The addition of the three missing characters in 
brackets [知其能] is unproblematic, as they are supplied by parallelism with the two 
previous sentences. See Li Ling 李零, Guodian Chujian jiaoduji 郭店楚簡校讀記 (Beijing: 
Zhongguo renmin daxue, 2002), 95.
110. I am referring the reader to the pages that show the slips’ photographs, and to 
the number of the slips where the text I am quoting appears.
111. The precondition of rectifying oneself through self-cultivation before attempting 
to govern the world is a common theme in early Chinese political texts. The locus classicus 
in the Analects reads: 子曰：苟正其身矣，於從政乎何有？不能正其身，如正人何？ 
(“The Master said: If a minister rectifies himself, what difficulty will he have in assisting 
in government? If he cannot rectify himself, how can he rectify others?”) The same theme 
appears with similar phrasing in parallel passages in Shuoyuan jinzhu jinyi 1.41 and 
Kongzi jiayu 孔子家語, ed. Wang Yuan 王淵 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 1987), 2.15.
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must receive offerings and religious rituals.112 Religious rituals have cer-
tainly the goal of modifying the gods’ interaction with humans, to make 
them benevolent. Yet they precisely assume that the gods’ agency is out-
side our control, and that it does not necessarily suit our interests.113
Together with these numinous forces, or precisely made out of a 
combination of them, we find the supra-notions of fate and time. In the 
last paragraph of The Way of Tang and Yu, the author argues that, even 
though Yao was born as Son of Heaven, and he had cultivated the vir-
tues, he would not have gained control of All under Heaven had not it 
been because of the matching forces of fate and time/opportunity:
古者堯生114 於115­天子，而有天下，聖以遇命，仁以逢時。116 未嘗遇[命
而] 117並 118於大時，神明將 119從，天地佑之，120縱仁聖可與，121­時弗可
及矣。(Guodian 40: 14–15)
112. Guodian Chumu zhujian, 157.
113. Puett, The Ambivalence of Creation, 27–28 and 35–36.
114. sheng 生 can be read as “being born” in the royal family with the succeeding king 
position, as in my translation above, or as sheng 升, to raise as Son of Heaven, much as 
Shun would raise after Yao despite his plebeian origins. As Cook notes, in the received 
literature there is more evidence for Yao having received the throne through hereditary 
succession than by abdication. See Cook, The Bamboo Texts of Guodian, vol. 1, 559, footnote 
87. Although it seems open to interpretation in this text, I would suggest that, Tang Yu zhi 
dao being an open and unapologetic statement in favor of abdication, had the author 
wanted to claim non-royal origins for Yao, he would have done so more explicitly.
115. Li Ling reads yu 於 as wei 為. Li Ling, Guodian Chujian jiaoduji, 98. Also in Li Ling 
“Guodian Chujian jiaoduji” 郭店楚簡校讀記, Daojia wenhua yanjiu 17 (1999), 455–56.
116. Zhou Fengwu ends the sentence here, and Cook follows. I agree with this 
arrangement. See Zhou Fengwu 周鳳五, “Guodian Chumu zhujian ‘Tang Yu zhi Dao’ 
xinshi” 郭店楚墓竹簡唐虞之道新釋, Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan 
70.3 (1999), 739–59; and Cook, The Bamboo Texts of Guodian, vol. 1, 559, footnote 90.
117. Missing characters. Li Ling supplies them with xian 賢 and sui 雖. Li Ling, 
Guodian Chujian jiaoduji, 98. I follow Zhou Fengwu, “Guodian Chumu zhujian ‘Tang Yu 
zhi Dao’ xinshi,” and Cook, The Bamboo Texts of Guodian, in the choice of characters, but 
not in their reading.
118. I follow Li Ling, Guodian Chujian jiaoduji, 98, in reading bing 並as bing 秉, to grasp.
119. The editors rendered this graph as jun 均: “all,” “equally.” Even though the 
change in meaning is not decisive, I follow Li Ling, Guodian Chujian jiaodjui, 98, in 
reading jiang 將.
120. Li Ling punctuates with a comma where other editors have seen a full stop. I 
follow Li Ling, Guodian Chujian jiaoduji, 98, and Chen Wei 陳偉, Guodian zhushu bieshi 
郭店竹書別釋 (Wuhan: Hubei jiaoyu, 2012) to see the entire sentence as a hypothetical 
conditional: “had he not yet” (wei chang 未嘗), “then, even though” (cong 縱). For a 
summary of other arrangements and word choices, see Cook, The Bamboo Texts of Guo-
dian, vol. 1, 559 and Allan, Buried Ideas, 130.
121. I follow Li Ling, Guodian Chujian jiaoduji, 98, in reading yu 與 as ju 舉, to elevate.
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In antiquity, Yao was born as the Son of Heaven, but the reason why he 
was in control of All under Heaven was that his sagely virtue encoun-
tered [favorable] fate, and his humanity met with [appropriate] times. 
Had he not yet encountered his fate and grasped the great opportunity, 
[with the result that] everything numinous and luminous would fol-
low, [and that] Heaven and Earth would assist him, [then] even though 
his humanity and sagacity were worthy of elevation, the right time 
could not have been made to arrive.
Similar arguments can be seen in the Qiongda yishi 窮達以時, also a 
bamboo text from Guodian, which argued that historical figures such 
as Shun and Guan Zhong 管仲 were only able to succeed by virtue of 
timely and fated encounters.122 Ming is that external and objective reality 
that one encounters (yu 遇), for good or bad. Often it only frustrates the 
subject’s aspirations. Nevertheless, when the course of fate matches the 
moral qualities of a person, we can expect great outcomes.
But, even though it escapes our control and can act in detriment to our 
goals, according to Tang Yu zhi dao, ming should become an object of our 
accepting understanding. The bamboo manuscript contains the phrase 
zhi ming, understanding fate, in the following context:
夫古者舜居於草茅之中而不憂，登 123­為天子而不驕。居草茅之中而不
憂，知命也。登為天子而不驕，不專124 也。(Guodian 40: 16–17)
In antiquity, Shun lived in the countryside125 and this did not make 
him afflicted. When he became the Son of Heaven, this did not make 
122. See Valmisa, “Beyond our Control?”
123. This graph has been read as shen 身 (“his person”) by the original editors, and 
as sheng 升, (“to elevate”) by Qiu Xigui and others. I follow Li Ling, Guodian Chujian 
jiaoduji, 98, in reading deng 登, with the similar meaning of “climbing up,” “rising.” All 
choices point at the same reading.
124. I follow Li Ling’s reading of this graph as zhuan 專, “especial,” “unique.” 
Another possible reading is liu 流, in the sense of “to give oneself to abandon.” See 
Cook, The Bamboo Texts of Gudodian, vol. 1, 560. I understand bu zhuan 不專 in the same 
sense given in other early texts of not acting arbitrarily and tyrannically according to 
one’s own wishes. See, for instance, Wenzi 4: 5b (不為始，不專己), and Qian fu lun jian 
jiaozheng 潛夫論箋校正, attributed to Wang Fu 王符, ed. Peng Duo 彭鐸 (Taipei: Zhon-
ghua, 1985), 6.25.293 (不專任以斷事). If we read the graph as zhuan 專, it can also be 
understood in the sense of “monopolizing” (the throne, or its benefits; see Allan, Buried 
Ideas, 93–95) within a family lineage. Namely, the opposite of abdication, as in the 
opening sentence of the manuscript: 唐虞之道，禪而不專 (“The way of Tang and Yu 
was to abdicate and not to monopolize”) (Li Ling, Guodian Chujian jiaoduji, 95).
125. Other texts, such as the manuscript from the Shanghai Museum Collection 
Zigao 子羔, and the Zhanguo ce 戰國策, coincide in that Yao found Shun in the middle 
footnote continued on next page
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him arrogant.126 Living in the countryside without feeling affliction is 
to understand fate. Becoming the Son of Heaven without turning arro-
gant is not to feel special.
The precedent that Shun set became a teaching for the contemporane-
ous generation of politicians:
方在下位，不以匹夫為輕；及其有天下也，不以天下為重。有天下弗能
益，無天下弗能損。(Guodian 40: 18–19)
When placed in a low position, they must not consider the ordinary 
person unimportant. And when in possession of All under Heaven, 
they must not consider [the possession of] All under Heaven as the 
most important. Possessing All under Heaven does not add anything. 
Not possessing All under Heaven does not decrease anything.
The author of the Tang Yu zhi dao encourages his contemporary 
politicians to “understand fate” the way Shun did. Even when Shun 
lived in a low position in the middle of nowhere, the author observes, 
he had no thirst to become powerful and important. As Sarah Allan 
notes, “the statement that Shun did not feel resentful even though he 
lived in a thatched hut [what I have translated as the “countryside”] 
implies that before Yao raised him up, he was a man of worth waiting 
for recognition rather than a simple farmer.”127 Allan interprets Shun’s 
behavior as virtuous. He would be “the epitome of humility.”128 In my 
understanding, Shun knew that sociopolitical rise was outside of his 
control, no matter how cultivated and well prepared he could be to be 
of service to the realm. His lack of emotional response in the face of 
of the countryside, that is, far away from the court. See Cook, The Bamboo Texts of Guo-
dian, vol. 1, 560, footnote 102.
126. The idea of rising to a high position or being morally superior without show-
ing pride is a common theme in early texts. For superiority in terms of moral character, 
see the Analects, which contrasts the superior and inferior person in this way: 君子泰而
不驕，小人驕而不泰 (“The gentleman is poised and not arrogant; the base person is 
arrogant and not poised”) (Lun yü zhushu 13.119b). For superiority in terms of position, 
see Zhong yong describing the gentleman: 是故居上不驕，為下不倍 (“Thus, when occu-
pying a high position he is not arrogant, and in a low position he is not insubordinate”) 
(Zhong yong zhushu 31.898a). A closer contrast to the one that appears in Tang Yu zhi dao 
is found in Lüshi chunqiu 1.2.21: 上為天子而不驕，下為匹夫而不惛 (“Acting above as 
the Son of Heaven he is not arrogant; acting below as a common man he is not 
depressed”).
127. Allan, Buried Ideas, 109.
128. Allan, Buried Ideas, 109.
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the unresponsiveness of the world to his moral cultivation shows his 
realism. It shows that Shun understands ming.129
Of course, understanding ming is a characteristic of the virtuous per-
son and a precondition to become a gentleman, because the fact that 
one understands ming has the implication that the external world of fate 
cannot impose any limits on one’s inner moral development.130 Shun 
would not wish for anything to change; he had no aspirations or desires 
for his life to become different. He would not show ambition, resent-
ment, or regret. Understanding fate has, then, two sides. On one hand, 
while self-cultivation is in our power and control, the subject has no say 
on what will happen as a consequence of his moral behavior, because 
this outcome belongs to the external realm of fate. From this perspective, 
fate can act as a detrimental limit to human agency, and becomes prob-
lematic. On the other hand, when one understands the workings of fate 
and accepts them, fate cannot do anything against the subject’s mind, 
against his interiority. The subject’s moral autonomy remains intact as 
an untouchable and invulnerable inner realm. This is one of the pro-
posed solutions to the problem of the reification of fate in early China.
Implications
We have seen that the reifying pattern of thinking about the relation-
ship between the person and the world construes fate as a hypostasized 
entity with object-like features. Yet in early China fate is an object that 
acts. How can this be the case? Can objects be agents? When we think 
about agency, we normally think about subjective, human agency. In 
the standard theory, agency is the capacity to select intentional, goal- 
directed actions. The agent’s mental states and processes cause the inten-
tionality of action that will lead to actually acting.131 Our conception of 
agency, insofar it regards distinctively human agency, is permeated with 
qualities such as intentionality, purpose, volition, reflectivity, empathy, 
129. A reader interested in literary and philosophical comparisons will like to know 
that there are similar lines of argument in the Western tradition. Famously, Petrarch’s 
Remedies Against Fortuna reinterpreted the Stoic standpoint towards fate and created a 
therapeutic manual to learn to cope with Fortuna’s capricious lashes. The advice was 
to develop indifference and distance: to learn to care as little for lucky outcomes as for 
disastrous ones.
130. On “understanding ming” as a precondition to becoming a gentleman, see the 
Analects: 不知命，無以為君子也 (“If one does not understand ming, one does not have 
the means to become a gentleman”) (Lun yü zhushu 20.180a).
131. On the standard conception and theory of agency, see Markus Schlosser, 
“Agency,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2015 edition, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/agency/.
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and meaning, all of them qualities that, in principle, cannot be ascribed 
to non-thinking, unconscious objects.
Many have been the critics of the standard theory of agency, which, it 
has been repeatedly argued, fails to capture the phenomenon of agency 
in all of its complexity. In particular, the critics have questioned the 
necessity of the notions of intentionality and causation when we discuss 
agency, as it seems that entities without intentional capacity can also per-
form actions. Within this line of thought, sociologist Bruno Latour has 
redefined agency to account for non-human and non-subjective agents. 
If we were to suspend the qualities that we associate with humanity and 
subjectivity, and to reduce agency to its minimal notion, we would find 
that anything that “modifies a state of affairs by making a difference” 
is an agent.132 In his analysis, a minimal notion of agency allows for a 
wider understanding of what may count as an agent, a participant in 
the course of action.
As a sophisticated identification test, Latour has devised some herme-
neutical keys to decipher when we may be dealing with an agent in oral or 
written accounts. I have found it an illuminating exercise to reflect on how 
these tests apply to the early Chinese notion of ming. First of all, Latour 
points out, agencies are always presented in accounts as doing something. 
An agency must make a difference in the course of some other agent’s 
action; it must produce an effect, a change in the state of affairs. Something 
that does not produce transformation and makes no difference is not an 
agency.133 In early Chinese accounts, ming when understood as fate-object 
is always presented as doing things, making things happen as well as 
preventing things from happening. Ming has a concrete and visible effect 
on the lives of humans, which according to Latour’s foremost and most 
fundamental test would qualify it as an agent.
Second, agencies must have figurations; namely, they must appear 
fleshed out in accounts, identified with something no matter how vague 
this identification may be. Contrary to his fellow social scientists, Latour 
insists that there are many more figures to illustrate agency than anthro-
pomorphic ones. Also, the same agency might be illustrated and dis-
cussed using a variety of different kinds of figurations.134 Throughout 
this article we have seen a diversity of accounts of non-human agency 
figurations, concretely in the forms of the times, the generation, an 
opportunity, and a somewhat vaguer but overarching supra-entity 
132. Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 71.
133. Latour, Reassembling the Social, 52–53.
134. Latour, Reassembling the Social, 54. When actors have more than one figuration, 
or no explicit figuration yet, Latour calls them “actants.”
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named fate. These would be but different figurations to represent the 
same agent (or “actant” in Latour’s vocabulary).135
At the same time, Latour continues, accounts of agency are likely to 
withdraw other possible agencies as illegitimate.136 We often see this 
phenomenon in early Chinese texts, with structures in the form of 非 x 
也, y 也 (it is not due to x, it is due to y), or 皆 x 也, 非 y (it is all due to 
x, not to y). These structures most often oppose the agencies of Heaven 
and the human, or that of fate and the human. For instance, one of the 
chapters of the Zhuangzi attributes the “ten thousand types of evil” to 
the agency of Heaven, withdrawing the possibility that those evils could 
come from humanity: 若是而萬惡至者，皆天也，而非人也 (“If this is so 
yet the ten thousand types of evil arrive, it is all due to Heaven, not to 
men”).137 Contrasting what lies with humans and what lies with fate, the 
Liezi explains that 然而生生死死，非物非我，皆命也 (“All of the lives 
and deaths do not lie with other entities and do not lie with myself: 
they all depend on fate”).138 The opposite case is found in the Shuo yuan, 
where Confucius identifies three kinds of death that are self-inflicted, 
and cannot be attributed to fate: 此三者，非命也，人自取之 (“These 
three (kinds of death) are not due to fate; people take hold of them 
themselves”)139 All these examples show Heaven and fate represented 
as agents in accounts that identify a source of agency by means of with-
drawing the possibility of a different source of agency’s responsibility 
for a certain outcome or event.
Finally, according to Latour, agencies have their own accounts of the 
theory of action where they fit, as a meta-theory about how agency acts. 
These theories of action explain how the agency is supposed to act, how 
it makes things happen or prevents things from happening; in short, 
how it makes its influence felt.140 For instance, one may ask whether 
the agent acts directly or, on the contrary, whether it has a mediator. 
There are different ways in which we can understand non-human and 
non-subjective agency in early Chinese philosophy. If we can agree that 
fate is construed as an object in the early Chinese reifying pattern of 
thinking, and that at the same time it is presented as an agent, it is then 
time to ask how fate is portrayed to act.
135. The early Chinese loose identifications of a hybrid and obscure agency behind 
certain actions, events, or behaviors, as in “x is due to fate,” should remind us of 
today’s equally loose ascriptions of actions, events, and behaviors to similarly hybrid 
and obscure entities such as “culture,” as in “she did x because it is her culture.”
136. Latour, Reassembling the Social, 56.
137. Zhuangzi jijie 23.201.
138. Liezi jishi 6.6.203.
139. Shuo yuan jinzhu jinyi 17.7b–8a.
140. Latour, Reassembling the Social, 58.
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Early Chinese accounts of the agency of fate fail to provide a definite 
theory of action. Even more, many of these accounts openly claim the 
impossibility of knowing how fate acts, with the result that we find our-
selves at a loss when attempting to identify a theory of action behind 
fate’s non-subjective agency. In this situation, a comparison with the 
way in which Heaven is portrayed to act in early texts is in order. As 
opposed to fate, Heaven is portrayed exercising its agency in a vari-
ety of ways. First of all, Heaven, when an intentional, subjective, and 
anthropomorphized force, takes direct action when it supports a virtu-
ous leader or when it sends down warnings and calamities in the form 
of natural phenomena. In the Mozi we learn that, as a reward to the 
ancient sages’ efforts to understand Heaven’s will (tian zhi 天志) and to 
act according to it,
天之為寒熱也節，四時調，陰陽雨露也時，五穀孰，六畜遂，疾災戾疫
凶饑則不至。141
Heaven made heat and cold temperature be well adjusted, the four 
seasons harmonious, the yin yang and rain and dew, [Heaven] made 
timely. [As a consequence], the five [kinds of] grains could ripen, and 
the six [kinds of] domestic animals could mature. Disease, disasters, 
crime, pestilence, inauspiciousness, and famine did not arrive.
That is to say, Heaven is portrayed causing things to happen through 
its own power.142 But Heaven can also act through other means. In mod-
ern social sciences there are different theories of social agentivity that 
aim to explain how social and nonphysical entities such as corpora-
tions and economic structures can take action, not directly but through 
the use of human representatives.143 Although social and collective 
objects are not supposed to be able to act in physical ways, they can 
take action through physical agents, such as the people who work and 
lead the corporations. In early Chinese texts, Heaven is also sometimes 
141. Mozi xiangu 墨子閒詁, ed. Sun Yiran 孫詒讓 (Taipei: Shijie, 1962), 7.27: 182.
142. This is also the case of the personification of life span as a deity, Siming, the 
Manager of Allotments. As a subjective and intentional entity, Siming displays capacity 
to comprehend and respond to human queries, as well as to act through its own power.
143. See Edward Heath Robinson, “A Theory of Social Agentivity and its Integra-
tion into the Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering,” Interna-
tional Journal on Semantic Web and Information Systems 7.4 (2011), 62–86. Some scholars 
have already suggested something similar. Chen Daqi 陳大齊, referring to the Mengzi’s 
observation that “what is done without no one doing it, is due to Heaven” (莫之為而
為者，天也), interprets that Heaven acts through human agency. See Chen, Mengzi dai 
jie lu 孟子待解錄 (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu, 1981), 94–96. See the discussion in Shun, 
Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 77.
THE REIFICATION OF FATE IN EARLY CHINA 47
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/eac.2019.6
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 87.220.62.23, on 08 Jul 2019 at 08:06:45, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
 portrayed as making use of human agents to achieve its goals (note that 
the word “agent” in English also has the meaning of “acting on behalf 
of another”).





Yue Zheng saw Mencius and said to him: “I told the prince about you, 
and he was going to come and meet with you. However, among his 
favorites there is a Zang Cang, who stopped him, and consequently 
the prince will not come, although that was originally his purpose.” 
Mencius said: “If [I were supposed to] advance, there would have been 
someone to favor it (the prince’s meeting). If [I were supposed] not to 
advance, there would be someone to impede it (the prince’s meeting). 
To advance or not to advance is beyond human power. My not encoun-
tering the prince of Lu is because of Heaven. How could that son of the 
Zang family cause me not to encounter (an opportunity)?”
Mencius’ failure to encounter the right opportunity to advance in 
his career, the meeting with the prince of Lu, even though seemingly 
provoked by a persuasive Zang Cang who would have spoken to the 
prince against Mencius, must be understood as the workings of Heaven 
through a human representative. Zang Cang, or any other person for 
that matter, Mencius explains, has no power to prevent the rise and fall 
of opportunities. Only Heaven has the capacity to do so, yet Heaven 
acts through human agents in whom therefore the responsibility and 
causation of outcomes is erroneously placed.
Finally, as a third theory of Heavenly action we find the wuwei 無
為 theory. Some texts describe the actions of Heaven as “non-action,” 
namely non-goal oriented, spontaneous and, importantly, non-inten-
tional. This is the case in texts that share a worldview in which Heaven 
should not be anthropomorphized, but should rather be understood 
as a natural element. The Lun heng offers a well-known refutation of 
the purported subjective qualities of intentionality and purposiveness 
of Heaven, and explains that the actions of Heaven happen in a natu-
ral, spontaneous way. In particular, the “Ziran” 自然 chapter responds 
to common arguments, such as those of the Mozi, which claim that 
Heaven produces goods and means of sustenance for the benefit of 
144. Mengzi zhushu 2B.48a.
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humans (或說以為天生五穀以食人),145 or that Heaven has intentions, as 
movement must be preceded by desire (有欲故動).146 In opposition to 
these views, the chapter argues that the movement of Heaven is unin-
tentional (bu yu 不欲) and spontaneous (ziran 自然). Much as the dao 道 
is repeatedly portrayed to act in early texts, the Heaven of the Lun heng 
acts in a wuwei manner.
But what about ming-fate? Could it possibly also act through 
non-action? To my knowledge, there are no accounts that relate ming 
and wuwei in early China. Does fate act directly, then, or perhaps 
through human agents? When fate is made responsible for a prema-
ture death, is it acting directly to end the appointed person’s life? Or, 
when fate is made responsible for someone’s distress and misfortune, 
is it acting through human agents, which we could call key actors, 
who would function as fate’s puppets to bring a particular situation 
about? Although we may want to hypothesize that this might be the 
case, the truth is that our early accounts are far from clear in this 
respect.
Early texts do not construe a clear relationship between fate, as an 
agent, and its actions. They are not concerned with how fate acts, or, for 
that matter, with the theory of action behind fate’s agency. What they are 
concerned about, and what they tirelessly emphasize, is the fact that fate 
does act and that its actions are widely felt, despite human inability to 




Zhongni said: “Death and life, preservation and loss, failure and suc-
cess, poverty and wealth, worthiness and unworthiness, slander and 
praise, hunger and thirst, cold and heat; these are the transformations 
of circumstances, the operations of fate. Day and night, they replace 
each other before us, yet our understanding has not capacity to dis-
cover their origination.”
The operations of fate (命之行) are felt worldwide, yet their origina-
tion remains in the dark for human knowledge. As I have previously 
noted, according to early Chinese accounts of fate’s agency, the way in 
which fate acts is mysterious, which makes it difficult if not impossible 
to understand the theory of action that lies behind. As a consequence 
145. Lun heng jiaoshi 54.775.
146. Lun heng jiaoshi 54.776.
147. Zhuangzi jijie 5.52.
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of the process of reification, fate became an unknowable and opaque 
object towards which human knowledge stayed powerless. The qual-
ification of unknowability, to be often seen in early texts, seems to go 
even further. Not only it is true that the ways in which fate exercises its 
influence on human life are unknowable, but even more so that, when 
humans search for a causing agency, and they fail to find out why and 
how something happened, then they attribute it to fate.
An anecdote in the Zhuangzi provides a clear illustration of this train 
of thought. This is the way in which Zisang explains how he reached the 





[Zisang] said: “I was thinking about what may have caused me to reach 
such an extreme situation, and I could not reach a conclusion. How 
would my parents have wished me to be so poor? Heaven covers all 
without partiality, and Earth sustains all without partiality; how would 
have Heaven and Earth made me so poor with such a partiality? I was 
trying to find out what had done it, and I could not do so. But here I am 
in this extreme situation: it is no other than fate!”
A second way in which humans recognize the agency of fate, as opposed 
to other causal agencies, is when they attempt by all means to reach a 
particular outcome or to attain a certain goal, yet they fail. Then they 
find as explanation that there is a major force working against their 
efforts, which they call fate:
孔子遊於匡，宋人圍之數匝，而絃歌不惙。子路入見，曰：何夫子之娛
也？孔子曰：來吾語女。我諱窮久矣，而不免，命也.149
When Confucius was travelling in Kuang, some people of Song sur-
rounded him several ranks deep, but he kept singing to his lute with-
out being troubled by it. Entering, Zilu saw him and said: “How is it, 
Master, that you are so amused?” Confucius replied: “Come here, and 
I will tell you. I have been trying to avoid such a strait for a long time, 
and the fact that I have not been able to escape it shows that it is due 
to fate.”
148. Zhuangzi jijie 6.69.
149. Zhuangzi jijie 17.145.
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These two ways of identifying fate as the agent behind inexplicable 
and inevitable outcomes remind us of the two definitions of ming with 
which we began the discussion. First, from the point of view of the caus-
ing agency, we saw that ming was what happens with no one causing it. 
Namely, what happens not as a consequence of human effort, and with 
unknown cause and means of execution. Just like Zisang observes in the 
passage above, when an outcome is inexplicable and we cannot ascribe 
its agency to any other potential agent, the outcome must be attributed 
to fate. Second, from the point of view of its repercussion in humans, we 
saw that ming was what remained beyond our control, the inevitable. 
Much as Confucius observes in the passage above, when we put our 
efforts in achieving a particular goal yet we do not succeed, it shows that 
the outcome is inevitable and it must be due to fate. The way in which 
fate acts is described as inexplicable and inevitable, unknowable and 
inviolable. Which leads us to the conclusion that the theory of action 
behind fate’s agency in early Chinese philosophy is no other than a the-
ory of inexplicability and inevitability.150
This discussion helps us pinpoint which might be the central feature 
of fate in early China: fate’s unknowability, accompanied by its inevi-
tability, makes it the most uncertain of agencies, the one that produces 
the deepest sense of helplessness in humans. At the core of the human 
experience of fate we find mystery, uncertainty, and helplessness. Much 
as any other agent, human or non-human, fate displays its own form 
of autonomy. No autonomous agent can be fully controlled, and there-
fore the interaction with autonomous agents generates contingency and 
uncertainty. This is very clear in the early Chinese military literature. 
The commander can never fully predict how the enemy will behave, 
at the same time that the enemy can never fully predict how the other 
commander and his army will behave. This deadlock entails the issue 
of “double contingency.”151 The commander applies all sorts of strate-
gies and techniques to predict and manipulate the enemy’s behavior, 
but the enemy’s response is ultimately out of the commander’s  control. 
150. In his article in defense of fatalism, Solomon explained that “Fate and fatalism 
can exist without acknowledging any agency. The emphasis is on the narrative where 
outcomes are doomed necessary, and not in the agency producing them.” See Robert 
C. Solomon, “On Fate and Fatalism,” 442. His study does not concern Chinese views of 
fate and fatalism. Speaking specifically for the early Chinese case, I agree with his 
general claim in that narratives privilege the necessary character of outcomes over the 
means or the agency that make these outcomes happen. However, in early China fate 
is thought of as an agent, even though an agent whose theory of action remains 
unknowable.
151. The term “double contingency” was first coined by Talcott Parsons, The Social 
System (New York: Free Press, 1951).
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 However, as contingent as the interaction between two intentional agents 
might be, in dealing with another subjectivity, as we have seen, there are 
many possible transactions. There are possibilities of communication, 
interpretation, persuasion, prediction, anticipation, even manipulation.
There are no such possible transactions in the face of autonomous, 
non-subjective agency such as a reified, opaque fate. The fact that the 
motives or intentions behind fate’s actions can never be known (prob-
ably because it is a non-intentional form of agency), combined with 
the fact that the outcomes of fate’s agency are ultimately inviolable 
and inevitable, makes of fate, in the mind of early Chinese thinkers, the 
single most overwhelming kind of agency that there is.
The blows of fate made people feel helpless. In Greek, the sense of 
helplessness and want of means was expressed in the term amechanía, 
literally the lack of mechané, the cunning or device humans can use to 
get out of a situation of existential difficulty.152 As philosopher and cul-
tural critic Sloterdijk remarks, by lacking mechané “human beings are 
denied just what the Greeks believed made them wholly human, that is, 
the ability to retaliate against attacks, being equipped with options for 
action or, as we would say today, being in full control of their agency.”153 
In other words, amechanía is the situation in which the person is deprived 
of the most basic sense of existential competence. If we call competence 
the possession of the skills, knowledge, or capacity required to perform 
effectively in a situation (usually a job in today’s language), existential 
competence is the possession of skills, the mechané, to act effectively in 
life. In the face of fate, early Chinese thinkers felt an inextricable lack of 
existential competence. The non-subjective agency of a reified fate hit 
humans out. It left them feeling powerless and humbled. The process of 
reification made of fate an agent which could not be interpreted, tackled, 
or faced, but which could only be awaited and accepted in the best terms 
possible.
In order to recover existential competence, some new mechané must 
be created. Early Chinese thinkers designed a variety of philosophical 
strategies to cope with uncertainty and unpredictability in ordinary life, 
and to recover control and existential competence in the face of the vaga-
ries of fate and other phenomena beyond human power. They produced 
a series of competing responses to these issues, many of which remain 
relevant today.154
152. Sloterdijk, Selected Exaggerations, 266.
153. Sloterdijk, Selected Exaggerations, 266–67.
154. I have discussed some of these strategies in Valmisa, “Beyond our Control?” 
and at length in “Changing Along with the World: Adaptive Agency in Early China,” 
Ph.D. dissertation (Princeton University, 2017), ch. 4, 253–328.
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